Deconstructing decentralization in China
Fiscal incentive versus local autonomy in policy implementation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12423208 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Philip Hsu (0000-0001-5510-7137, corresponding author), Philip S Hsu |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 13 |
| Issue | 40 |
| Pages | 567-599 |
| Publication date | 2004-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Contemporary China (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1067-0564 • E-ISSN: 1469-9400 |
| Publisher | Routledge (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/1067056042000213409 |
| OpenAlex | W2119014362 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
This article examines the congruent and conflicting effects of fiscal decentralization and power devolution—two main types of decentralization in post‐reform China—in order to tackle the insufficient distinction between them in current academic analyses. Derived from the two types of decentralization respectively are fiscal incentive and local autonomy, which influence local states' policy implementation in turnover taxation. By uncovering the unique logic of either factor, this article argues that contrary to what is widely presupposed, local autonomy is not necessarily congruent with fiscal incentive in affecting local compliance with centrally imposed policy rules during policy implementation. When power devolution and fiscal decentralization follow an internally consistent logic of decentralization as a whole by proceeding at the same pace and favoring the same specific locality, they inevitably generate conflicting effects on local states' implementation strategies. Congruent effects arise only if incoherent evolution occurs between the two types of decentralization. This paradox highlights the contradiction inveterate in the dynamics of decentralization. This argument is first developed through theoretical reasoning, and then substantiated by an empirical comparison between Guangzhou and Shanghai during 1984–1988 and 1992–1995
Argument (complex analysis · Autonomy · China · Decentralization · Devolution (biology · Economic system · Economics · Incentive · Market economy · Political economy · Political science · Power (physics · Public economics · Sociology · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Political Systems and Governance
When Top-Down Meets Bottom-Up
Public budgeting and finance reforms in China
Leadership, institutional autonomy, and cross-sector collaboration
Den flerhodede dragen – Mot en ny modell for kinesisk utenrikspolitikk
Between Dependency and Autonomy – Taiwanese Entrepreneurs and Local Chinese Governments
Learning a Lesson from Taiwan? A Comparison of Changes and Continuity of Labour Policies in Taiwan and China
When top‐down meets bottom‐up
Policy Reinvention and Diffusion
When Chinese Central Orders and Promotion Criteria Conflict
From Autonomous Areas to Non- Autonomous Areas
| Unique citing works | 10 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,63 |
| Citation span | 2010 - 2025 (16) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 10 |