When Chinese Central Orders and Promotion Criteria Conflict
Implementation Decisions on the Destitute in Poor versus Prosperous Cities
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6008441 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Dorothy J Solinger (University of California, Irvine, CA, USA, corresponding author), Ting Jiang (0000-0002-2276-9174, Metropolitan State University of Denver, CO, USA) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 571-606 |
| Publication date | 2016-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Modern China (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0097-7004 • E-ISSN: 1552-6836 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0097700416635507 |
| OpenAlex | W2327430569 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 36 |
The 1999 relief plan for China’s Minimum Livelihood Guarantee (called, for short, the dibao)—originally designed to assist all of the urban poor—changed by the mid-2000s, emphasizing employment, not handouts, for the able-bodied impecunious. Also, the center ordered that cities should subsidize just the most ill and needy. We find that only some Chinese cities—the less well-endowed and politically less prominent—responded to this shift by cutting back their percentage of merely unemployed recipients and increasing the percentage of the truly needy among their dibao beneficiaries. We suggest that two factors could account for this disparity: politicians in wealthier cities have greater autonomy; and they are closer to fulfilling a momentous career goal—stepping up to a post in the central government, and are thus more ambitious. It could be that in prosperous cities—where politicians have control over their budgets and where their trajectories have already positioned them near the peak of the mobility channel—leaders choose to keep the unemployed from protesting by continuing their allowances. This suggests that when two central concerns (redirecting the dibao and social stability) collide, officials in richer cities make different choices than do those in poorer cities
Autonomy · Central government · China · Control (management · Demographic economics · Development economics · Economic growth · Economics · Geography · Government (linguistics · Livelihood · Local government · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Promotion (chess · Subsidy · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration · Social Policy and Reform Studies
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Local Energy Efficiency Policy Implementation in China
Authoritarian Environmentalism Undermined? Local Leaders’ Time Horizons and Environmental Policy Implementation in China
State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China
The Politics of the New Welfare State
Changing Welfare States
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Poverty and anti-poverty measures in China
Trapped in poverty? A study of the dibao programme in Shanghai
Changing Approaches of Social Protection
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Working for the Peasants? Strategic Interactions and Unintended Consequences in the Chinese Rural Tax Reform
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Political Machinations in a Rural County
Uneven Policy Implementation in Rural China
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Tackling unemployment in China
Chinese Communist Politics in Action
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Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China
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| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,4 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2019 (4) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |