Bargaining Among Farmers, Goodwill, and the Success of Cooperatives
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12614324 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ram Ranjan (0000-0002-8756-9392, Macquarie University Sydney Australia, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 88 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 589-610 |
| Publication date | 2017-05-04 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1370-4788 • E-ISSN: 1467-8292 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/apce.12172 |
| OpenAlex | W2611476128 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 27 |
A model of concessional bargaining among farmers explains the success (or lack thereof) of cooperative institutions in rural farm settings in the developing regions. Concessional bargaining in day‐to‐day interactions generates goodwill, which helps smoothen future dealings amongst farmers as well as with outside agents. In particular, we model the existence of goodwill amongst farmers as enhancing their ability to collectively bargain with an outside dealer that buys their farm produce. Results suggest that when dealing with each other, farmers offer higher concessions when the risk of loss or reversal in bargaining power is high; however, the level of concession is also influenced by the degree of reciprocity and parameters that affect bargaining surplus. Findings provide further insights over the success of cooperative institutions in rural farm settings where inter‐farmer goodwill dynamics determines the cooperative's bargaining outcomes. Specifically, when farmers generously reciprocate each other's goodwill gestures, it leads to better outcomes through increasing their cooperative reservation price. In contrast, when the degree of reciprocity is lower, or when the risk of bargaining power switching is higher, farmers extract more surplus from other farmers, and this also lowers the cooperative's bargaining outcomes and makes the cooperative arrangement unviable in the long term
Bargaining power · Business · Economics · Goodwill · Labour economics · Microeconomics · Reciprocity (cultural anthropology · Cooperative Studies and Economics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Microfinance and Financial Inclusion · Finance
Governing the Commons
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Social Capital and the Collective Management of Resources
Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
Public Goods
The Struggle to Govern the Commons
Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
Networks and organizations
Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
Economic Action and Social Structure
Social Capital and the Environment
Achieving Sustainability and Development through Collective Action? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of the Bore Pool Sharing Program on Farm Incomes and Crop Choices
Common Property Institutions and Sustainable Governance of Resources
Shared irrigation costs
From the Lab to the Field
Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons
The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |