Symbolic belief in social cognition
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12750010 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Evan Westra (0000-0003-2005-7998, Purdue University West Lafayette, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 388-408 |
| Publication date | 2023-10-15 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Perspectives (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1520-8583 • E-ISSN: 1758-2245 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phpe.12196 |
| OpenAlex | W4387650085 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 78 |
Keeping track of what others believe is a central part of human social cognition. However, the social relevance of those beliefs can vary a great deal. Some belief attributions mostly tell us about what a person is likely to do next. Other belief attributions tell us more about a person's social identity. In this paper, I argue that we cope with this challenge by employing two distinct concepts of belief in our everyday social interactions. The epistemic concept of belief is primarily used to keep track of what other people take to be true, and this informs how we predict and interpret their behaviors. The symbolic concept of belief, in contrast, is primarily used as a means of signaling one's social identity to other members of one's community. In turn, community members closely monitor each other's symbolic beliefs as a means of enforcing social norms
Attribution · Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Epistemology · Identity (music · Relevance (law · Social cognition · Social group · Social identity theory · Symbolic interactionism · The Symbolic · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
Advocacy and the function of folk psychology
Dimensions of identity-representing belief
Life-Course Transitions and Political Orientations
Motivational pessimism and motivated cognition
Religious beliefs and social practices
Who remembers fake historical figures? Differentiating between passing knowledge and dispositional openness in cultural research
New Approaches to Hedging
Mindreading
Mindshaping
Simulating Minds
Religious credence is not factual belief
Beliefs about beliefs [P&W, SR&B]
Folk Psychology as Simulation
The essential moral self
Why Do We Hate Hypocrites? Evidence for a Theory of False Signaling
The Regulative Dimension of Folk Psychology
Belief is weak
The looping effects of human kinds
Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy
Meta-Analysis of Theory-of-Mind Development
To Believe Is Not to Think
Nothing about collective irrationalities makes sense except in the light of cooperation
Dangerous beliefs, effective signals
Signalling, commitment, and strategic absurdities
The signaling function of sharing fake stories
Socially adaptive belief
A tribal mind
The marketplace of rationalizations
In Defense of Ordinary Moral Character Judgment
Does think mean the same thing as believe? Linguistic insights into religious cognition
I think , I mean and I believe in political discourse
Conspiracy Theories
Moral Reputation
Pushmi-Pullyu Representations
Atheism, theism, and the self
Folk personality psychology
Stereotypes, theory of mind, and the action–prediction hierarchy
Enculturating folk psychologists
Belief and Knowledge
The role of categorization and in-group norms in judgments of groups and their members
The development of reasoning about beliefs
The search for predictable moral partners
What are the chances you’re right about everything? An epistemic challenge for modern partisanship
The virtues of gossip
Trust Me, I Believe in God
Sentence-initial I think (that) and I believe (that)
Measuring Misperceptions
Observations on embedding verbs, evidentiality, and presupposition
Mindreading beyond belief
Shared Norms and the Evolution of Ethnic Markers
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |