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Virtue and Our Way of Death

Bibliographic Data

ID14949494
AuthorsJennifer Ryan Lockhart (0000-0001-5599-5875, Auburn University, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume33
Issue3
Pages1170-1191
Publication date2025-09-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEuropean Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ejop.13062
OpenAlexW4408803471
LanguageEN
References cited17

This paper explores an argument for the claim that human flourishing is not possible. The argument is situated within the context of Aristotelian virtue ethics. It begins with a formal claim about the virtues: whatever substantive account we give of them, they are forms of excellence that equip us to lead flourishing lives. Yet, when we turn to our best substantive account of the virtues by considering those people who seem to be the best candidates for possessing the virtues, these often don't live flourishing lives. Moreover, this fact about them is not an accident, but there is a sense in which it is because of their seeming virtues that they fail to flourish. So, our best candidates for the virtues turn out not, after all, to be true virtues (when considered in light of the formal constraint just mentioned). But we also know that we need the virtues to flourish, since any amount of worldly success without the virtues can never amount to flourishing. Therefore, human flourishing is impossible. I call this condition, of having no true substantive account of the virtues that could constitute a way of life, having a ‘way of death.’ In this paper, I explore the plausibility of the premises of this argument by considering the life of Socrates—whether his life can count as a flourishing life and whether he can be considered truly virtuous. I argue that there is good reason to answer both questions in the negative and that this offers us a deeper understanding of Socratic ignorance and of the significance of aporia for Socratic philosophical activity

Epistemology · Virtue · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Theology and Philosophy of Evil · War, Ethics, and Justification

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Highly citedNo

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