Law, emotion and the objectivity debate
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 14971227 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Renata Grossi (0000-0002-2011-9848, University of Technology Sydney, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 28 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 23-36 |
| Publication date | 2019-01-02 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Griffith Law Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1038-3441 • E-ISSN: 1839-4205 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/10383441.2019.1627042 |
| OpenAlex | W2949182567 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 9 |
This article will argue that emotional thinking and decision-making does not lead to an abandonment of objectivity when we drill down and consider what precisely we mean by both emotion and objectivity in law. In doing this I do not necessarily wish either to accept or to challenge the importance that objectivity occupies in our legal thinking, but merely to reconsider its definition and hope for a more nuanced conversation around its significance, purpose and function. I will argue that if we accept a meaning of emotion that connects it to rationality, and if we accept a meaning of objectivity which connects it to our agency, then emotion and objectivity are not opposites, but rather, two mutually reliant and essential parts of legal thinking and legal decision making
Conversation · Epistemology · Objectivity (philosophy · Political science · Rationality · Sociology · Law · Law in Society and Culture · Philosophy · Psychology
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.67 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2024 (5) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |