Moral Emotions and Social Economic Games in Paranoia

Bibliographic Data

ID15516552
AuthorsGeorge Savulich (0000-0002-6513-5454, University of Cambridge, corresponding author), Hannah Jeanes (0009-0002-3553-2309, University of Cambridge), Nicole Rossides (University of Cambridge), Sahaj Kaur (0000-0002-3446-6082, University of Cambridge), Alice Zacharia (University of Cambridge), Trevor W Robbins (0000-0003-0642-5977, University of Cambridge), Barbara J Sahakian (0000-0001-7352-1745, University of Cambridge)
Year2018
Volume9
Pages615-615
Publication date2018-11-21
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueFrontiers in Psychiatry (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1664-0640 • E-ISSN: 1664-0640
PublisherFrontiers Media (PUBLISHER • CH)
DOI10.3389/fpsyt.2018.00615
PMID30524323
OpenAlexW2900518354
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited58

Impaired social cognitive processes are putative psychological mechanisms implicated in the formation and maintenance of paranoid beliefs. Paranoia denotes unfounded fears about the hostile intentions of others and is prevalent in a significant proportion of the general population. We investigated social cognition in healthy participants selectively recruited to have a broad occurrence of paranoid thinking ( n = 89). Participants completed a novel computerized task of moral emotions and two social economic exchange games (Prisoner's Dilemma, Ultimatum Game) from the EMOTICOM neuropsychological test battery. Regression analyses revealed that delusional ideation predicted shameful feelings when the victim of deliberate harm by another person. Cooperative behavior on the Prisoner's Dilemma was greatest when the participant and opponent contributed equally to joint earnings. Participants demonstrated significantly more punishment behavior when contributions were unequal and stole more from the opponent using a suspicious strategy of gameplay. In addition, paranoid thinking was positively associated with more stealing from the cooperative opponent. On the Ultimatum Game, participants accepted significantly more unequal offers when the opponent contributed more and sensitivity to fairness was greatest when the participant contributed more. These data demonstrate that delusional ideation predicts a maladaptive emotional response to interpersonal harm and that paranoid thinking may lead to reduced cooperation toward mutual reward. The effects of paranoia on moral emotions and pro-social behavior at more severe levels of persecutory thinking warrant further investigation

Dictator game · Dilemma · Paranoia · Population · Psychotherapist · Social decision making · Social dilemma · Ultimatum game · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Psychopathy, Forensic Psychiatry, Sexual Offending · Psychosomatic Disorders and Their Treatments · Social Psychology

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