Does Evaluation Change Teacher Effort and Performance? Quasi-experimental Evidence from a Policy of Retesting Students
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19318237 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Esteban Aucejo (Arizona State University), Teresa Romano (0000-0002-3375-0065, Oxford College of Emory University), Eric S Taylor (Harvard University) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 104 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 417-430 |
| Publication date | 2022-05-09 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Review of Economics and Statistics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-6535 • E-ISSN: 1530-9142 |
| Publisher | MIT Press - Journals (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1162/rest_a_00962 |
| OpenAlex | W3048157196 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 37 |
We document measurable, lasting gains in student achievement caused by a change in teachers' evaluation incentives. A short-lived rule created a discontinuity in teachers' incentives when allocating effort across their assigned students: students who failed an initial end-of-year test were retested a few weeks later, and then only the higher of the two scores was used when calculating the teacher's evaluation score. One year later, long after the discontinuity in incentives had ended, retested students scored 0.03σ higher than nonretested students. Otherwise identical students were treated differently by teachers because of evaluation incentives, despite arguably equal returns to teacher effort
Academic achievement · Demographic economics · Discontinuity (linguistics) · Economics · Incentive · Mathematics education · Microeconomics · Regression discontinuity design · Statistics · Student achievement · Test (biology) · Educational Assessment and Improvement · Innovations in Educational Methods · Mathematics · Psychology · School Choice and Performance
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Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses
Generalizations about Using Value-Added Measures of Teacher Quality
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Rotten Apples
Injecting Charter School Best Practices into Traditional Public Schools
Accountability and Flexibility in Public Schools
Measuring the Impacts of Teachers II
Accountability, incentives and behavior
School Accountability, Postsecondary Attainment, and Earnings
Left Behind by Design
The impact of no Child Left Behind on student achievement
Incentives, Selection, and Teacher Performance
Accountability in US Education
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2025 (4) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |