Response‐dependence and normativity

Bibliographic Data

ID20142307
AuthorsYifan Sun (0000-0002-4205-2103, Department of Philosophy The Chinese University of Hong Kong Shatin Hong Kong, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume88
Issue6
Pages1128-1143
Publication date2022-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12429
OpenAlexW4293716221
LanguageEN
References cited46

A non‐normative, response‐dependent view about morality can avoid metaphysical extravagance and explain why the extension of some non‐normative concepts can non‐accidentally match the extension of moral concepts. These features make it a plausible reductive account of moral properties. However, some philosophers believe that a response‐dependent account of morality must contain an irreducibly normative component. I argue that it is impossible to defend such a position while retaining the response‐dependent nature of morality in the ordinary sense. However, I believe that philosophers' motivation for engaging in such a philosophical project should be taken seriously. The underlying concern is that the plausibility of a response‐dependent view makes people's strong commitment to irreducible normativity a puzzle that requires an explanation. I explain why people systematically fail to give up this commitment without claiming that they rationally cannot give it up, which means a non‐normative response‐dependent view is immune from such a challenge

Epistemology · Extension (predicate logic) · Metaphysics · Morality · Normative · Sociology · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

Tools

Open DOI