Schopenhauer, Kant and Compassion

Bibliographic Data

ID20510643
AuthorsPaul Guyer (0000-0001-7195-6710, John Brown University, corresponding author)
Year2012
Volume17
Issue3
Pages403-429
Publication date2012-11-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueKantian Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1369-4154 • E-ISSN: 2044-2394
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s1369415412000155
OpenAlexW2129932540
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited15

Schopenhauer presents his moral philosophy as diametrically opposed to that of Kant: for him, pure practical reason is an illusion and morality can arise only from the feeling of compassion, while for Kant it cannot be based on such a feeling and can be based only on pure practical reason. But the difference is not as great as Schopenhauer makes it seem, because for him compassion is supposed to arise from metaphysical insight into the unity of all being, thus from pure if theoretical reason, while for Kant pure practical reason works only by effecting a feeling of respect (in the ‘Critical’ works) or by cultivating, i.e. affecting, natural dispositions to moral feeling (in the ‘post-Critical’ works). I argue that Kant's is the more realistic theory on this point

Cognitive psychology · Compassion · Epistemology · Feeling · Illusion · Metaphysics · Morality · Theology · Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Hegel · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology

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