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Semicompatibilism and Moral Responsibility for Actions and Omissions

In Defence of Symmetrical Requirements

Bibliographic Data

ID21293496
AuthorsTaylor W Cyr (0000-0002-0500-8496, Samford University, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume99
Issue2
Pages349-363
Publication date2021-04-03
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueAustralasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00048402.2020.1738512
OpenAlexW3012748433
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited28

Although convinced by Frankfurt-style cases that moral responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise, semicompatibilists have not wanted to accept a parallel claim about moral responsibility for omissions, and so they have accepted asymmetrical requirements on moral responsibility for actions and for omissions. In previous work, I have presented a challenge to various attempts at defending this asymmetry. My view is that semicompatibilists should give up these defences and instead adopt symmetrical requirements on moral responsibility for actions and omissions, and in this paper I highlight three advantages of doing so: first, it avoids a strange implication of the truth of determinism; second, it allows for a principled reply to Philip Swenson’s recent ‘No Principled Difference Argument’; third, it provides a reason to reject a crucial inference rule invoked by Peter van Inwagen’s ‘Direct Argument’ for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and determinism

Business · Epistemology · Law and economics · Moral responsibility · Sociology · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophy · Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification

  • Why there are no Frankfurt‐style omission cases

    Open Access•J Metz•Noûs•2025

  • Indecision and Buridan’s Principle

    Open Access•Daniel Coren•Synthese•2022

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    Open Access•Ori Beck•Synthese•2021

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    Open Access•Derk Pereboom•Living Without Free Will•2001

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    Harry G Frankfurt•The Journal of Philosophy•1969

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    John Locke, Peter H Nidditch•The Clarendon Edition of the…•1690

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    Open Access•Harry G Frankfurt•Importance of What We Care About•1988

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    Peter Van Inwagen•The Philosophical Review•1978

  • A Hard‐line Reply to Pereboom’s Four‐Case Manipulation Argument 1

    Open Access•Michael Mckenna•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2008

  • Replies

    Open Access•John Martin Fischer•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2009

  • Omissions, Responsibility, and Symmetry

    Open Access•Randolph Clarke•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2011

  • Moral Responsibility and Omissions

    Jeremy Byrd•The Philosophical Quarterly•2007

  • The Frankfurt Cases and Responsibility for Omissions

    Philip Swenson•The Philosophical Quarterly•2016

Unique citing works3
Citations per year0,6
Citation span2021 - 2025 (5)
Citation velocityrecent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 3

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