The Frankfurt Cases and Responsibility for Omissions

Bibliographic Data

ID4351871
AuthorsPhilip Swenson (Rutgers Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights, corresponding author)
Year2016
Volume66
Issue264
Pages579-595
Publication date2016-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqv127
OpenAlexW2471874453
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited15

In previous work, I presented a challenge for philosophers who appeal to the Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs) in order to undermine the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). My challenge relied on the claim that there are cases of omitting to act in which the agent is not responsible for her behavior (or lack thereof) and which should yield the same verdict regarding responsibility as the Frankfurt-style cases. In this paper I take a closer look at particular accounts of responsibility for omissions on offer in the literature and argue that they fail to overcome my challenge. In particular I focus on accounts offered by Fischer and Ravizza, Randolph Clarke, and Carolina Sartorio.

Appeal · Art · Economics · Epistemology · Focus (optics) · Law and economics · Literature · Moral responsibility · Order (exchange) · Political science · Sociology · Style (visual arts) · Verdict · Work (physics) · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification

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