The Interorganizational Effects of Reform Prosecution Declination Policies

Bibliographic Data

ID21560872
AuthorsNicholas Goldrosen (0000-0002-6198-6593, Criminal Justice Research Center, Pennsylvania State University, Susan Welch Liberal Arts Building, corresponding author)
Year2026
Pages1-27
Publication date2026-03-14
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJustice Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0741-8825 • E-ISSN: 1745-9109
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/07418825.2026.2643212
OpenAlexW7135391506
LanguageEN
References cited57

Many reform-oriented chief prosecutors have adopted policies categorically declining to prosecute certain offenses, but little is known about how these policies affect police behavior. This article examines how police enforcement responds to these policies. Using Manhattan District Attorney Alvin Bragg’s 2022 declination policy as a case study, the analysis exploits New York City’s unique institutional structure—five independently elected prosecutors served by a single police department—to implement a difference-in-differences design. Drawing on precinct-month arrest and summons data from 2016 to 2024, I find that the policy reduced arrests for covered offenses while modestly increasing the use of summonses, with no evidence of enforcement displacement to more serious offenses. These effects were concentrated in offenses subject to presumptive rather than categorical declination and varied across precincts. The findings highlight the importance of interorganizational relationships and informal signaling between prosecutors and police in shaping the practical impact of reform prosecution

Declination · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Criminal Justice and Corrections Analysis · Wildlife Conservation and Criminology Analyses

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access