Why does it matter to individuate the senses

A Brentanian approach

Bibliographic Data

ID21603407
AuthorsGuillaume Fréchette (0000-0002-7413-3290, Department of Philosophy University of Geneva Geneve Switzerland, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume31
Issue2
Pages413-430
Publication date2023-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEuropean Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ejop.12735
PMID38504942
OpenAlexW3209267943
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited23

How do we individuate the senses, what exactly do we do when we do so, and why does it matter? In the following article, I propose a general answer to these related questions based on Franz Brentano's views on the senses. After a short survey of various answers offered in the recent literature on the senses, I distinguish between two major ways of answering this question, causally and descriptively, arguing that only answers giving priority to description and to the classification involved in it are on the right track for a general answer to the related questions. In the second part of the article, I argue that Brentano's descriptive psychology is an attractive candidate for such an answer. His descriptive psychology provides a plausible account of the classification involved in description, in particular regarding the classification of sensory qualities. I close the article by briefly explaining how Brentano spells out the priority of descriptive answers over causal ones

Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Descriptive research · Epistemology · Social science · Sociology · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology

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