The interpersonal effects of emotion on rejection of severely unfair ultimatum proposal
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21620120 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Davide Pietroni (0000-0003-0400-1222, University of Chieti-Pescara), Sibylla Hughes Verdi, Sibylla Verdi (University of Padua), Felice Giuliani (0000-0002-2429-5865, University of Chieti-Pescara, corresponding author), Angelo Rosa (0000-0003-2151-6156, Libera Università Maria SS. Assunta), Fabio Del Missier (0000-0003-4681-5857, University of Trieste), Riccardo Palumbo (0000-0003-4230-5817, University of Chieti-Pescara) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 1-21 |
| Publication date | 2022-01-11 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Journal of Conflict Management (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1044-4068 • E-ISSN: 1758-8545 |
| Publisher | Emerald (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1108/ijcma-03-2021-0049 |
| OpenAlex | W3194521514 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 47 |
Purpose The purpose of this study is to investigate how the emotion expressed by a fictitious proposer influences the responder’s decision to accept or reject a severely unfair deal, represented by the splitting of a predetermined sum of money between the two players during an ultimatum game (UG). Rejection leads both parts to dissipate that sum. Critically the authors consider the situation in which both players have the best alternative to negotiation agreement (BATNA), which simulates a backup plan to rely on in case of no agreement. Design/methodology/approach The participants played a UG and, to foster the ecological validity of the paradigm, the parts could both rely on a more or less generous BATNA. The critical manipulation was the emotion expressed by the proposer while their BATNA was either hidden (Exp. 1) or communicated (Exp. 2). Findings The proposer’s emotions influenced participants’ own emotions, affected their social evaluations about the proposer, the desire for future interactions with the proposer and were used to infer the proposer’s BATNA when it was unknown. In this latter case, proposers’ emotions and in particular his/her happiness, decreased dramatically the participants’ tendency to reject even severely unfair offers. Originality/value Past research on UG has been predominantly aimed to investigate the effect of responders’ emotions or the effects of responders’ emotions on the proposer, devoting little attention to how the critical responder’s acceptance/rejection decision might be affected by the proposer’s emotion. Especially in the ecological situation where the parts have a BATNA in case of non-agreement
Anger · Happiness · Interpersonal communication · Negotiation · Originality · Sociology · Ultimatum game · Conflict Management and Negotiation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Psychology · Psychology of Social Influence · Social Psychology
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Anomalies
Social Utility in Ultimatum Bargaining
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |