Status cues and moral judgment

Formal attire induces moral favoritism but not for hypocrites

Bibliographic Data

ID21622833
AuthorsMing Dong (0000-0001-8547-3808, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, corresponding author), Jan-Willem Van Prooijen (0000-0001-6236-0819, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam), Paul A M Van Lange (0000-0001-7774-6984, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
Year2024
Volume43
Issue21
Pages19247-19263
Publication date2024-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueCurrent Psychology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1046-1310 • E-ISSN: 1936-4733
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s12144-024-05747-6
OpenAlexW4391997966
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited53

Status-related impressions influence important interpersonal dynamics, including moral judgments of good or bad, and right or wrong, whereas these impressions can be formed based on subtle cues (e.g., formal versus casual attire of transgressors). The current research examined how attire influences moral judgments in transgressive contexts and for different transgressions. We proposed that attire would have different effects on moral judgments depending on whether transgressions were accompanied with contradictory moral claims (i.e., hypocrisy versus non-hypocrisy), and attire and hypocrisy would influence moral judgments through perceived intentionality (i.e., whether transgressions were committed intentionally or accidentally). We tested these hypotheses in four studies (total N = 1,007; including two pre-registered), by examining both people’s moral blame of transgressive behaviors and their moral impressions (e.g., trustworthiness and compassion) of the transgressors. Findings were largely in line with hypotheses: People favored formal- over casual-attire targets when both transgressed in non-hypocritical contexts and with ambiguous intentionality (Studies 1 to 3). However, moral favoritism based on formal attire was diminished when transgressions were hypocritical and perceived as intentional (Studies 2 to 4). For various contexts where people (need to) make moral judgments, our findings suggest that cues of high status are key ingredients to moral evaluations, but signs of hypocrisy and intentionality may seriously undermine the workings of these cues

Blame · Casual · Construal level theory · Epistemology · Hypocrisy · Intentionality · Moral disengagement · Morality · Cultural Differences and Values · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social and Intergroup Psychology · Social Psychology

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