Who detects and why
How do individual differences in cognitive characteristics underpin different types of responses to reasoning tasks
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21689100 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Nikola Erceg (0000-0002-9056-4592, University of Zagreb, corresponding author), Zvonimir Galić (0000-0001-5710-0975, University of Zagreb), Andreja Bubic (0000-0002-9122-9809, University of Split), Dino Jelić (University of Zagreb) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 29 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 594-642 |
| Publication date | 2023-10-02 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Thinking & Reasoning (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1354-6783 • E-ISSN: 1464-0708 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/13546783.2022.2108897 |
| OpenAlex | W4292454270 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 66 |
People can solve reasoning tasks in different ways depending on how much conflict they detected and whether they were accurate or not. The hybrid dual-process model presumes that these different types of responses correspond to different strengths of logical intuitions, with correct responses given with little conflict detection indicating very strong, and incorrect responses given with little conflict detection very weak logical intuitions. Across two studies, we observed that individual differences in abilities, skills, and dispositions underpinned these different response types, with correct non-detection trials being related to highest, and incorrect non-detection trials to lowest scores on these traits, both for cognitive reflection and belief-bias tasks. In sum, it seems that every individual difference variable that we measured was important for the development of strong logical intuitions, with numeracy and the need for cognition being especially important for intuitive correct responding to cognitive reflection tasks. In line with the hybrid dual-process model, we argue that abilities and dispositions serve primarily for developing mindware and strong intuitions, and not for detecting conflict, which has repercussions for the validity of these tasks as measures of reflection/analytical thinking
Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Logical reasoning · Child and Animal Learning Development · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies · Psychology · Social Psychology
The Rationality Quotient
Conflict monitoring in dual process theories of thinking
Is the cognitive reflection test a measure of both reflection and intuition?
Fast logic?
Intuition, reason, and metacognition
Assessing miserly information processing
Miserliness in human cognition
Why does the Cognitive Reflection Test (sometimes) predict utilitarian moral judgment (and other things)?
What makes us think? A three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement
Numeracy and Decision Making
Measuring Risk Literacy
Bias and Conflict
The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning
Distinguishing the reflective, algorithmic, and autonomous minds
The Cognitive Reflection Test as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks
Investigating an alternate form of the cognitive reflection test
Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition
Predicting individual differences in conflict detection and bias susceptibility during reasoning
From slow to fast logic
Domain-specific experience and dual-process thinking
From bias to sound intuiting
A diffusion model analysis of belief bias
Assessing the validity of inferences from scores on the cognitive reflection test
The Development and Testing of a New Version of the Cognitive Reflection Test Applying Item Response Theory (IRT)
Measuring cognitive reflection without maths
The need for cognition
The empirical case for two systems of reasoning
How numeracy influences risk comprehension and medical decision making
Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |