A Hybrid Account of Concepts Within the Predictive Processing Paradigm
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21823218 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christian Michel (0000-0001-9962-5403, University of Edinburgh, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 14 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1349-1375 |
| Publication date | 2023-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Review of Philosophy and Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1878-5158 • E-ISSN: 1878-5166 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s13164-022-00648-8 |
| OpenAlex | W4286500055 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 61 |
We seem to learn and use concepts in a variety of heterogenous “formats”, including exemplars, prototypes, and theories. Different strategies have been proposed to account for this diversity. Hybridists consider instances in different formats to be instances of a single concept. Pluralists think that each instance in a different format is a different concept. Eliminativists deny that the different instances in different formats pertain to a scientifically fruitful kind and recommend eliminating the notion of a “concept” entirely. In recent years, hybridism has received the most attention and support. However, we are still lacking a cognitive-computational model for concept representation and processing that would underpin hybridism. The aim of this paper is to advance the understanding of concepts by grounding hybridism in a neuroscientific model within the Predictive Processing framework. In the suggested view, the different formats are not distinct parts of a concept but arise from different ways of processing a functionally unified representational structure
Cognition · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Management science · Metaphysics · Philosophy of mind · Philosophy of science · Sociology · Action Observation and Synchronization · Child and Animal Learning Development · Computer Science · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Philosophy · Psychology · Artificial Intelligence
Why Internal Representations and Their Temporal Dependence Matter for Emotion Inference
Invariant representations in abstract concept grounding – the physical world in grounded cognition
Conceptual engineering, predictive processing, and a new implementation problem
Memory labels against concept eliminativism
What and How Emotions Represent
Entropy, prediction and the cultural ecosystem of human cognition
Doing without Concepts
Surfing Uncertainty
Furnishing the Mind
On the genesis of abstract ideas.
Conceptual representations in mind and brain
Building machines that learn and think like people
The role of theories in conceptual coherence.
Psychological essentialism in children
The Neural Representation of Abstract Words
Context theory of classification learning.
Canonical Microcircuits for Predictive Coding
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
The free-energy principle
The Predictive Mind
Overcoming the modal/amodal dichotomy of concepts
Concept contextualism through the lens of Predictive Processing
New directions in predictive processing
Similarity Reimagined (with Implications for a Theory of Concepts)
Concepts and categorization
The plurality of concepts
Splitting Concepts
Concepts as Pluralistic Hybrids
Bridging the Gap between Similarity and Causality
The Big Concepts Paper
Reconstructing constructivism
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2026 (4) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |