Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis and Mode Selection of Reward-Based Crowdfunding From the Perspective of Value Co-Creation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 22106949 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Bin Liu (0000-0002-7467-2331, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology), Xiaoran Wu (0000-0001-5438-0510, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology), Nan Shi (0000-0002-2750-9777, SAIC Audi, Shanghai, Jiading, China) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 10 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 3043-3053 |
| Publication date | 2023-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2329-924X • E-ISSN: 2373-7476 |
| Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1109/tcss.2023.3240528 |
| OpenAlex | W4319303141 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 16 |
Crowdfunding refers to releasing fund-raising projects and raising funds through the Internet. To explore the relationship between platform resource investment and value creation in interactive learning between initiators and supporters, this article constructs a three-party game model among the platform, supporters, and the initiator, based on evolutionary game theory, and then obtains the replicator dynamics function of the player and analyzes the evolution trend. Further, this article analyzes the optimal pricing decision of the platform and the initiator under different crowdfunding modes and its optimal mode. The results show that there are two Evolutionary Stable Strategies that are accepted by three players under certain parameters, and the equilibrium point remains stable under external interference. When the net income of initiators participating in value co-creation increases, it can promote the crowdfunding platform to actively participate in the value co-creation process, while it will inhibit the participation of the platform when the net loss of initiators participating in value co-creation increases. In addition, although supporters will also be affected by the willingness of the platform to participate in value co-creation, the willingness of initiators to participate has a greater impact on supporters. As for the mode selection, when the platform does not provide fee preference, considering that the prices of the initiators in the crowdfunding period are the same, single-stage crowdfunding is the dominant mode, and the income of the platform and the initiators is also higher than that under the two-stage crowdfunding. When the product price in the single-stage crowdfunding period is lower than that in the two-stage sales period, the two-stage crowdfunding is the best choice for the initiator
Business · Economics · Industrial organization · Microeconomics · Preference · Replicator equation · Willingness to pay · Computer Science · FinTech, Crowdfunding, Digital Finance · Microfinance and Financial Inclusion · Sharing Economy and Platforms · Marketing
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| Citations per year | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Highly cited | No |