Empirically Testable Causal Mechanism for Divine Action
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 22136902 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Arlyn Culwick (corresponding author), Ryan L Faber (0000-0003-2929-2695, corresponding author), Ryan Faber |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 6 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 247-282 |
| Publication date | 2021-01-22 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Stellenbosch Theological Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2413-9459 • E-ISSN: 2413-9467 |
| Publisher | Christian Literature Fund (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.17570/stj.2020.v6n4.a10 |
| OpenAlex | W4234407085 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
A form of special divine action often considered central to the everyday experience of Christianity is that of a personal interaction with God. For example, in The Second Person Perspective in Aquinas’s Ethics, Andrew Pinsent characterises this interaction in terms of mutually empathic relations that serve to “infuse” virtues and other attributes into a person. Such interaction requires that causal relations exist between a necessary being and the contingent universe. This paper addresses a central problem of special divine action: that the empirically identifiable causes of physical events are modally ill-suited for (and epistemically distinct from) the action of an eternal, non-composite, necessary being. Accounts of what brings about physical events are standardly empirical accounts, grounded upon experience of the world
Autonomy · Ecclesiology · Epistemology · Political science · Politics · Polity · Sociology · Theology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Medieval Philosophy and Theology · Philosophy · Psychology · Reformation and Early Modern Christianity · Reformed Theology and Governance · Social Psychology · Theology and Philosophy of Evil · Artificial Intelligence
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |