Accountability without Equality in Social Relations with Thinking Animals

Bibliographic Data

ID22329321
AuthorsJon Garthoff (0000-0003-0599-1619, University of Tennessee at Knoxville, corresponding author)
Year2026
Volume58
Issue172
Pages249-275
Publication date2026-05-09
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueCritica (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0011-1503 • E-ISSN: 1870-4905
PublisherUniversidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (PUBLISHER • MX)
DOI10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2026.1789
OpenAlexW7160938085
LanguageEN
References cited48

This essay makes a case that the ethical phenomena of accountability and recognition are not, as is widely believed, grounded in the psychological capacity of self-conscious reflective thought characteristic of persons. We know this because we have relationships of accountability and recognition with some animals who are clearly not self-conscious in that sense. On the other hand, not all conscious animals are capable of accountability or recognition. Thus we must focus on a capacity intermediate between mere conscious awareness and self-consciousness in order to explain accountability and recognition

Accountability · Social accounting · Social relation · Social responsibility · Environmental Philosophy and Ethics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications

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