Welfare and Rational Care
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8092905 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Stephen Darwall (0000-0002-3855-6464, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2002 |
| Pages | 152 |
| Publication date | 2002-12-31 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | Welfare and Rational Care (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Princeton University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1515/9781400825325 |
| OpenAlex | W1535673142 |
| Open Library | OL29026978M |
| ISBN | 9781400825325 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 92 |
| References cited | 1 |
What kind of life best ensures human welfare? Since the ancient Greeks, this question has been as central to ethical philosophy as to ordinary reflection. But what exactly is welfare? This question has suffered from relative neglect. And, as Stephen Darwall shows, it has done so at a price. Presenting a provocative new "rational care theory of welfare," Darwall proves that a proper understanding of welfare fundamentally changes how we think about what is best for people. Most philosophers have assumed that a person's welfare is what is good from her point of view, namely, what she has a distinctive reason to pursue. In the now standard terminology, welfare is assumed to have an "agent-relative normativity." Darwall by contrast argues that someone's good is what one should want for that person insofar as one cares for her. Welfare, in other words, is normative, but not peculiarly for the person whose welfare is at stake. In addition, Darwall makes the radical proposal that something's contributing to someone's welfare is the same thing as its being something one ought to want for her own sake, insofar as one cares. Darwall defends this theory with clarity, precision, and elegance, and with a subtle understanding of the place of sympathetic concern in the rich psychology of sympathy and empathy. His forceful arguments will change how we understand a concept central to ethics and our understanding of human bonds and human choices
Economics · Epistemology · Happiness · Normative · Political philosophy · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Welfare · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Caring · Contentment · Law · Philosophy
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Forgiveness
What Is This Thing Called Happiness?
Is There No Distinction between Reason and Emotion in Mengzi?
Virtue ethics in the medieval period
The Morality of Unequal Autonomy
The Phenomenology of Kantian Respect for Persons
The Global Heart Transplant and Caring across National Boundaries
Taking Utilitarianism Seriously
Respect and Membership in the Moral Community
Accountability without Equality in Social Relations with Thinking Animals
How Virtue Reforms Attachment to External Goods
Empathy as a counter to political violence
A Simple Solution to the Scope Problem
On Not Being “Worth It”
Theories of Well-Being and Descriptive Adequacy
Prudential Perfectionism
Finding consensus on well-being in education
Well-Being and Pluralism
Well-being Monism Defended
Integrating the Philosophy and Psychology of Well-Being
The Power of Belief
Circular Definitions of ‘Good’ and the Good of Circular Definitions
The many faces of hedonic adaptation
Competing claims egalitarianism, hybrid egalitarianism, or neither
Creative Resolve and the Threshold for a Minimally Good Life
On neutral value and fitting indifference
Decency
Value relations sans evaluative grounds
Normativity in Contemporary (and the History of) Ethics
The good life as the life in touch with the good
Normativity, prudence and welfare
Happiness and well‐being
Infinite ethics and the limits of impartiality
Taking the Morality Out of Happiness
Against the Normativity of Welfare
Good Enough? The Minimally Good Life Account of the Basic Minimum
Are Animals Persons? Why Ask
The Heart of Justice
Taking values seriously
Market socialism as a form of life
Meriting Concern and Meriting Respect
The Locative Analysis of Good For Formulated and Defended
The Case for Stance-Dependent Reasons
Three Kinds of Prioritarianism
The Motives for Moral Credit
Well-Being and Virtue
Eudaimonism Without Virtue
Every Climate Struggle is a Political Struggle
Adam Smith on Morality, Justice Andthe Political Constitution of Liberty
Is it possible to give scientific solutions to Grand Challenges? On the idea of grand challenges for life science research
Interpersonal Recognition and Responsiveness to Relevant Differences
Fit and Well-Being
Concurrent Awareness Desire Satisfactionism
Scales for Scope
Rational Choice, Changes in Values over Time, and Well-Being
A Working Test for Well-being
Forever Small
Should Eudaimonia Structure Professional Virtue
Artifactual normativity
Prudential value and impersonal value
Love First
Once more, without feeling
Exceptions in Nonderivative Value
Fitting-Attitude Analysis and the Logical Consequence Argument
Resisting buck-passing accounts of prudential value
The experience requirement on well-being
The Finality and Instrumentality of Value in a Way
A Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being
Life's Values
Happiness, the Self and Human Flourishing
An Analysis of Prudential Value
Against Beneficence
Understanding What’s Good for Us
Loving Someone in Particular
Is children’s wellbeing different from adults’ wellbeing
Pluralism about Well‐Being
Classifying theories of welfare
Preferentism and Self‐sacrifice
Virtue, Happiness, and Well-Being
Elderly Well-Being and Alcohol
Selecting Children
The right and the wrong kind of reasons
Well-being, part 1
Sympathy and Perspective-Taking in Confucian Ethics
Against 'Good for'/'Well-Being', for 'Simply Good
| Unique citing works | 92 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4,6 |
| Citation span | 2006 - 2026 (21) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 90 |