Dignity and the Value of Rejecting Profitable but Insulting Offers

Bibliographic Data

ID23213426
AuthorsE Athanasiou (New Economic School), Alex John London (0000-0002-6450-0309, Carnegie Mellon University), Kevin J S Zollman (0000-0001-9776-1890, Carnegie Mellon University)
Year2015
Volume124
Issue494
Pages409-448
Publication date2015-04-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueMind (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0026-4423 • E-ISSN: 1460-2113
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/mind/fzu186
OpenAlexW1986318524
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited12

In this paper we distinguish two competing conceptions of dignity, one recognizably Hobbesian and one recognizably Kantian. We provide a formal model of how decision-makers committed to these conceptions of dignity might reason when engaged in an economic transaction that is not inherently insulting, but in which it is possible for the dignity of the agent to be called into question. This is a modified version of the ultimatum game. We then use this model to illustrate ways in which the Kantian evaluative standpoint enjoys a kind of internal stability that the Hobbesian framework lacks. Our interpersonal argument shows that, under certain conditions, Hobbesians prefer to cultivate Kantian commitments in others and promote the presence of Kantians in the population. Our intrapersonal argument shows that agents who are conflicted between Kantian and Hobbesian commitments have powerful reasons not to resolve this commitment in favour of Hobbesian values. Our emulation argument illustrates that in repeated versions of the ultimatum game, the Hobbesian chooses to behave like a Kantian, including publicly repudiating her Hobbesian commitments. Here again, however, the Hobbesian is able to achieve a desired benefit only on the condition that there are genuine Kantians in the population. Finally, our social planning argument explores the reasons why a community of Hobbesians would opt to enshrine a Kantian conception of dignity into law. The paper concludes with some remarks about the policy implications of this work. The value or worth of a man is, as for all other things, his price, that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his power; and therefore is not absolute, but a thing dependent on the need and judgement of another ... The public worth of a man, which is the value set on him by the Common-wealth, is that which men commonly call DIGNITY. Hobbes, Leviathan X , 16

Argument (complex analysis) · Dignity · Epistemology · Kantian ethics · Law and economics · Political science · Population · Sociology · Value (mathematics) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Free Will and Agency · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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