The Threshold Effect
Preference Falsification Versus Weak Preferences in Russian War Support
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 24211484 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Isabelle DeSisto (0000-0002-2575-1957, Princeton University), Grigore Pop-Eleches (0000-0003-3570-6233, Princeton University), Jacob R Tucker (0009-0006-2089-9174, New York University) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Volume | 56 |
| Publication date | 2026-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | British Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-1234 • E-ISSN: 1469-2112 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0007123426101768 |
| OpenAlex | W7215089174 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 35 |
How reliable are surveys in autocracies? Using data from wartime Russia, we show why list experiments – commonly used to detect preference falsification – do not always reveal hidden dissent. We identify and test what we call the ‘threshold effect’: respondents may report support for a sensitive item in a direct question but omit it in a list experiment, not because they are lying, but because the list format can create a higher threshold for expressing support. We provide direct evidence of this effect and use two approaches to distinguish preference falsification from weak preferences. Both suggest that outright lying in Russia is limited, but many attitudes are weak and easily shaped by question framing. We conclude that while many Russians genuinely support the war against Ukraine, this support is shallow. Our findings suggest that researchers should take care when designing and interpreting survey questions that measure sensitive attitudes using indirect methods.
list experiment · preference falsification · question framing · Russian invasion of Ukraine · threshold effects · war support · weak preferences · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Survey Methodology and Nonresponse · Survey Sampling and Estimation Techniques
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| Highly cited | No |
|---|