Assessing organizational constraints on self-determination claims in civil conflicts

Bibliographic Data

ID24225151
AuthorsMinnie M Joo (0000-0001-5752-4444, University of Massachusetts Lowell), Eric Keels (0000-0001-7006-442X, University of Tennessee at Knoxville), Krista E Wiegand (0000-0001-8820-112X, University of Tennessee at Knoxville)
Year2026
Volume63
Issue3
Pages321-334
Publication date2026-06-20
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Peace Research (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/jopres/xjag015
OpenAlexW7155020161
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited69

Scholars of intrastate armed conflict have devoted significant attention to violent self-determination conflicts, frequently characterizing them as particularly pernicious. Not only do they promote significant government repression, but also efforts to resolve them often fail. This study aims to understand the conditions under which rebel groups adopt varying levels of self-determination claims, which can range from non-self-determination goals to local governance, territorial autonomy, or even more expansive ones, such as complete independence from the parent state. While adopting expansive self-determination claims may render strategic advantages, such as increased mobilization and loyalty, it may jeopardize rebel groups’ chances of negotiation with the government. Given this tradeoff of pursuing expansive self-determination claims, this paper theorizes that the rhetorical flexibility of self-determination claims is driven by contextual and organizational constraints faced by rebel groups. Contextually, we argue that rebel groups are generally likely to pursue more expansive self-determination claims in states with higher levels of democracy, since democratic institutions constrain violent state responses and provide more open and accessible channels for political participation by rebel actors. In terms of organizational structure, we theorize that highly centralized rebel groups are less likely to pursue expansive self-determination claims in democratic regimes to increase the chances of negotiation with the government. This, we suggest, is because centralized rebel groups are better able to attain mobilization and loyalty without relying on expansive self-determination claims. Statistical analyses using a novel dataset on issues raised by rebel groups provide empirical support to our claims.

civil conflict resolution · Democracy · intrastate armed conflict · Organizational structure · rebel groups · territorial autonomy · Political Conflict and Governance · Post-Soviet Geopolitical Dynamics · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence

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