Civilian support and the escalation of rebel demands during negotiations

Bibliographic Data

ID24225161
AuthorsJ‐l Thomas (0000-0001-8736-7523, University of California San Diego)
Year2026
Volume63
Issue3
Pages348-361
Publication date2026-06-20
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Peace Research (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/jopres/xjag020
OpenAlexW7160086071
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited67

Why do some rebel groups enlarge their demands during negotiations when escalated claims could threaten the stability of peace talks? This article engages with this question in the context of civil conflict by first demonstrating that radicalized or significantly elevated rebel demands can indeed shorten the duration of negotiations with the state. Next, the article examines why some rebel groups are willing to risk escalating their demands despite the negative consequences such radicalization can have on the bargaining process. I argue that variation in rebels’ propensities to radicalize their demands during talks reflects differences in groups’ abilities to accept the risks associated with a breakdown in negotiations. Rebel viability is put forth as a salient explanation: viable rebels are more likely to believe they possess both the bargaining leverage needed to extract large concessions and the ability to absorb the costs of continued fighting should negotiations falter. This article examines how one crucial source of rebel viability—rebels’ domestic civilian support bases—impacts rebel demand-making behavior. I use novel data on formal bargaining during civil conflicts in Africa from 1989 to 2010 to demonstrate that rebels escalate their demands more frequently when they draw support from a greater number of different civilian constituencies. This relationship is heightened during negotiations with the state. Together, the findings suggest that extensive support from the civilian population may incentivize rebels to engage in perilous bargaining strategies, particularly the steep escalation of their demands, which can impede a compromise settlement.

African civil wars · Bargaining power · Civil Conflict · civilian support · peace negotiations · Peacebuilding and International Security · Political Conflict and Governance · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence

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