Critical Philosophy of Race

Critical Philosophy of Race: Essays collects fifteen wide-ranging contributions by Robert Bernasconi on topics in the philosophy of race and the intellectual history of racial ideologies. Each chapter bears the distinctive traits of its author, displaying the historical depth and contextual subtlety of a scholar who possesses a remarkable facility with texts on these subjects. His basic procedure is to forage through understudied and often rare primary sources in order to reconstruct episodes of argument or ideology that lend nuances to our histories and philosophies of race. One rhetorical difficulty with this approach is that there can appear to be too many trees in the forest, as new contexts and details sprout up paragraph after paragraph. For my part, I prefer these dense woodlands to the desert landscapes offered by other scholars. Nonetheless, in this review I will resist the temptation to chop through the considerable textual thickets that our author has mapped for us. I present instead a picture of the kurieuon logos or “guiding argument” running through these fifteen chapters.As befits Bernasconi’s intention to present the philosophy of race as a critical enterprise, the guiding argument has a largely negative cast. Its main premise is that an exaggerated distinction between nature and culture has underwritten an overly simple opposition between racial realism and social constructionism. One result of this distinction is an artificial division of labor in the academy, for instance, between natural and social sciences. So critical philosophers of race must play a sort of Humpty Dumpty with their literary sources. A second, more damaging result is an ineffective strategy of antiracism. It turned race into an exclusively biological concept, one that belongs to nature rather than culture. When biologists eventually declared that there are no races, racism appeared to be an epistemological error: a racist, on the account targeted for criticism, is someone who discriminates against others on the basis of a false biological notion. Proponents of the standard approach thereby leave the moral, political, and social facts of racism largely untouched, obfuscating their power and suggesting something of their anomalousness due to the supposed biological unreality of race.A second key premise of the guiding argument is that racism “has frequently changed its form and the language in which it is expressed” (1). Race and racism are shifting targets of analysis, and to identify their current forms we will need a proper genealogical run-up.1 Bernasconi’s critical philosophy of race is thus an historical enterprise undertaken with an activist intention, and he argues that rival accounts of racism are overly simple and lack sufficient historical scope:Despite this warning and the sometimes-dizzying details of his genealogies, Bernasconi offers a fairly straightforward outline of his project. The five articles in Section II trace “The Construction of Race” from early modernity to the end of the nineteenth century, resulting in an historical or diachronic race-concept focused largely on reproduction. Section III provides a five-article interlude called “Black Philosophers Speak Out,” in which our author presents the insights of Afro-Caribbean and African-American thinkers as antidotes to some of these older racist theories. And the four articles in Section IV treat “The Construction of the Concept of Racism,” deploying the guiding argument as an attack on mainstream liberal approaches to racism. Bernasconi’s conclusion is that the popular notion of racism, codified in the UNESCO statements of 1951, was not informed by a genuine study of racist social formations (e.g., slavery, eugenics). Instead, UNESCO identified, and the academy subsequently adopted, the same strategy, only a kind of racism lite: once the term “racism” came to denote the error of using a wrong biological notion, it became an easy game to dispense with this racism lite while leaving the real racial problems in our world—racism extra—untouched.2All this negative work purports to produce a positive result: once we glimpse precisely how Humpty fell apart, we might put him together such that we can meaningfully track, and possibly counteract, the real racism operating in our world. The guiding argument, then, should be a very salutary development, one that would equip us (to quote the first sentence of the book) to put “philosophy to work in the fight against racism” (1). The most reasonable task for a critical reviewer, then, is to try and strengthen Bernasconi’s guiding argument. I attempt to do so mainly by separating it somewhat from the rhetorical contexts in which Bernasconi first articulated its premises. Running through these articles, in particular, is something of a defense of continental philosophy against the more analytic forms of the philosophy of race. On at least a few points he meets with success. Bernasconi has developed an important set of arguments about race and racism partly by examining texts from the continental tradition. But I take this to be merely a biographical fact about the author, and I find that many of his conclusions may be better defended when removed from their original contexts. The main points of contention, between him and me, are his frequent appeals to a phenomenological method and his reliance on a few canonical European philosophers like Nietzsche, Foucault, and Sartre.Bernasconi himself acknowledges, in his introduction, that our arguments ought not lean too heavily on our own subdisciplinary heritage:And it is true, as he proceeds to argue in most chapters, that philosophers from the continental tradition have offered many insights on race that analytic philosophers have yet to duly consider. But despite this, the continental versus analytic issue ought not be overstated: that is a local debate between two schools of Anglo-European philosophy. It is unlikely that the keys to understanding our global, or even our local, problems with race and racism will derive (except biographically) from either side of such a provincial divide. So, in reviewing Bernasconi’s histories and arguments I will try to remove the husk of continental methods and recommend a somewhat different and more interdisciplinary approach in its place. Here as elsewhere Bernasconi offers some of the key argumentative moves that need only be abstracted and reapplied.After a brief introductory chapter that places its subject mainly within the continental tradition, Critical Philosophy of Race presents five articles (Section II) on “The Construction of Race” through the late nineteenth century. The end goal of the section is to sketch a big history of how race concepts arose in a variety of endeavors (social, political, scientific, etc.). But the section culminates in a distinctive concept of race in the masterful (Chapter 6) “Crossed Lines in the Racialization Process: Race as a Border Concept,” which is probably the best summary of Bernasconi’s approach to these subjects. In that article, he explains the relationship between race—die Sache selbst—and racial categories. Race is an interpretive prism through which we experience our fellow humans, and we do so by applying common terms such as “white” or “Caucasian.” But these categories are fluid and interrelated. Racial terms such as “Black” or “white” apply differently over time and across contexts, and they possess a kind of meaning holism. Something similar holds of races themselves, suggesting that we should not study a given race “in isolation from the other races with which it has dealings” (107).Bernasconi argues further that in order to understand a given racial term at a given time and context, we should look to its borders rather than to its center. What, for instance, did “Black” or its equivalent terms mean in America at the turn of the twentieth century? To answer that we need to look to history and the law, for instance at the many attempts to define Blackness fractionally. These culminated, rather famously, in the one-drop rules common to American antimiscegenation law. But the concept “Black” was thereby fixed largely by its boundary cases: attempted passers, octoroons, and others who might have fit less obviously into the working racial scheme. At various points such schemes tend to break under the right pressures, but race and racism do not for that matter lose their grip on the world. Instead, new categories form just as new people are birthed. The “historical component” of the critical philosophy of race focuses partly on these shifts among categories, and the consequent changes of racialization scheme:Bernasconi takes great efforts to highlight inconsistencies—among racial science, law, various practices of racialization, reproductive issues, etc.—in the history of racism. But this does not prevent him from presenting and defending a straightforward historical thesis about the concept of a race or races. He argues in particular that in the mid- to late-nineteenth century there was a basic shift from a static to a dynamic conception. The early modern classification schemes, whether we look to Linnaeus, Kant, or Blumenbach, consisted of simple divisions of the four or five varieties of human. In some cases (e.g., Kant) these were supposed to be permanent, whereas in others (Blumenbach) there is a greater sense of the contingency of the categories themselves. But it was not until much later that theorists came to view races as the of and Bernasconi as the on this was in the of the of history that the from a largely static of races to an account which the or of thus argues that races are diachronic but that race terms and so the on are explains a race is an best across a of as once and there are in the historical of particular race once in to I might some of the in which Bernasconi the I find the basic argument about the of diachronic race concepts to a genuine common to from find in the nineteenth century a a an and an that accounts of how the the the practices developed in by or have to the of the race and to The these of the late nineteenth century was no as with or Kant, are the of but rather have the races of often the race or did the races not diachronic race concept would eventually its in and its in notion of race as a at these key Bernasconi a few episodes in the history of racism, in his and “The Philosophy of Race in the and in the The chapter the of who defended or the thesis that the four or five races were in fact is much to about Bernasconi’s accounts of the details of the but the is is the of a static as it does not account for how races might or It became once of and of were by a critical of The of a race became or and our of with the to these of Race in the Bernasconi argues that an history of racism will in to the social and so he some of the standard practices of of these Bernasconi thus through contexts (e.g., or and social should at this we of the early century have our own social that the for our slavery, and are and as as of other in which of race and racism play a Critical philosophers of race who to by Bernasconi’s guiding is to who an activist philosophy of have to how to to the social of our own need to the and the between our and the racial that for instance, to But we can do this only we understand how our common of race and racism were in to a different set of of these of Critical Philosophy of Race on the social consequent to to Bernasconi’s is how the of and in particular to such as big so much and philosophy in this have the races obviously for a of more races are do they or even races might they not rather be do we need to we are to racial or even these we find we look to the of among some of the more of the were over and race antimiscegenation and eventually and in order to from In the of these Bernasconi and a few historical on the subjects. He that the of the nineteenth century, the European with race turned into a of history in the more important in the from about to were The historical accounts of races to race to be of culture. The key to the set of that might prevent the of a given the or the or eventually the race. The in these contexts how to the of a race. And the answer is that we do so by reproduction. So, in the late nineteenth century there arose Bernasconi in his to chapter “The of Race how a of to about with the various for not to the of and other of the as Border is Bernasconi’s most in the historical “The of Race is his least much more than his the big argument. The premise of the chapter is that the historical shift in late race was by a of racial is true, and the scholar is in of on history that this Bernasconi instead his intention to into the to how race concepts in the in and to social such as the of race some to he to notion of as for in the task of the history of racism” might a rhetorical is to as an important as is probably of the original for the in But in the of this the instead of the on the and his to do the he appeals to the might the of a But Bernasconi himself the rather in of the and I that his might take these as an to further the of examining through the of critical this we can a few key conclusions from Bernasconi’s big there arose a or diachronic notion of race that racism of reproduction. do we a do so by race do we do antimiscegenation law, we into the twentieth century, we at and much Bernasconi has thus to trace a shift rather from races there are to the of how races are And he has so by the of to put it is through and through a matter of with the result that takes in the with the of races. Bernasconi many of the historical such as the in which he the between and our social later and the of And just as he the of race and in his account of In our century context, when a possibly has of the of our the to these rather of is and the as as many of the details of this history are from his account of the of diachronic of race to the of racism, which is a The main thesis will be that the modern of racism, racism to to the important social race. and were to put it an result of about Bernasconi has that racial tend to be just as in the the of to the historical of his argument, Critical Philosophy of Race five articles under the “Black Philosophers Speak In Bernasconi some defended by by The contributions on and is the subject of two this there is no sense in a few points of as they to the philosophies of race and racism. It would be to present an account of these the of among the texts we study and among the who our and To that Bernasconi’s to the has not argument or that he under his own but rather the work he has to for philosophers in the His accounts of the philosophers of the are on their but they more than an to the of us to for present and to further these more work is by of on the in which racism was in the by as as other And just the critical philosophy of race of our own the are philosophers Bernasconi and issue over Bernasconi’s of who a in modern provides the of an who in a time when who to our too to on the this work to then, no matter of merely a in a It is rather a matter of we as and to the in our and of a too and set of and In the main our and our view of its has not to the social contexts of our has a and that to this in the of in the of and the Bernasconi thus the by in the of European reviewing some of the intellectual and of and on the of in a similar task for The of the of a century later He work among the of through of and other texts to to the guiding argument, is chapter to Here Bernasconi a by analytic philosophers of became a key for for his in “The a on The of Bernasconi argues that the of this by the concept of race task in was he to the concept of was it to the of that term in rather to he as the of his own to the race in particular through and Here we might glimpse something of the critical of Bernasconi’s we approach it with a view to a that has of the sort is but of and as in this context, as a about the meaning of while its real for and for an even more than and should derive and from Bernasconi’s two and of Here the argument has its best was by we continental and from it he important such as popular term of from distinction between and through its it in the of a key racism. So, we have a real in which continental philosophers have in their that other philosophers and even who do not Bernasconi’s subdisciplinary should in of the the intention to a second by Bernasconi on Critical Philosophy of which would just some of our many contributions to racism in the history of philosophy. It to be then, of he will on the of the of and how the important work on philosophers into that On the it should the of who in the of the that philosophy and resulting from our have slavery, and is of our canonical and Bernasconi has as much as scholar to and to the His critical philosophy of race is thus no to the “philosophy of but rather a of philosophy in its And that not when we study the racist by one or as is too often but when we the history of philosophy with an to social and from the articles a section of four on “The Construction of the Concept of a of the argument that racism as a merely epistemological which Bernasconi over two and on the UNESCO statements and the of In the first and he the of the distinction through the work of to The is that developed a notion of culture that would the concept the of biologists they they racism as the of a biological But this approach is for Bernasconi’s own we not in argue that of biological concepts was the of slavery, and the UNESCO as racism, I have called thus to with the of study for who to defense against racism in its and history of racism” second chapter on this The of a against Racism,” the same argument to a different of He first argues that the to their of racism the basis of a study of racism” the argument as for it philosophers from the same as the and the was a strategy that was subsequently by And this is something of a on the of the the author, with of who did argue that racism in the of But the same holds against or argument that the concept of the philosophy of race called philosophy of with the as to whether the term to In the is supposed to be that race is not racism must in an epistemological or the of an might a result for who our time merely by people that there are no races, or that races are or have second thesis how the notion of racism lite its own this at least partly of its with In the II no one to be with So when racism was given such a that apply only to but not for instance, the social of the American it became easy for to the notion with a kind of by it we are to a remarkable of The new concept of racism to it in other and it thereby to an with the in which we One of Bernasconi’s is that the term “racism” in its modern racism and focused on in particular to the considerable between and and it us to the term while we to from and the of racism that philosophers not the analytic have the with should there are about us that the “racism” is the power that Bernasconi is to might something by with the late twentieth century, at least some people own rather than Bernasconi has that the power of the “racism” that the term be racism is something we in with the that we who so are not racist In other the term consequent to its epistemological and in its common as a has a method of by The I to to his is the that this of “racism” we would rather racism, racism, racism, power has probably a few I not I would prefer to in a “racism” and take on positive so we this review by Bernasconi’s main that the epistemological argument from an exaggerated and form of the It thus to this review to something about the for this The first strategy is and in like chapter and the Construction of In that chapter Bernasconi argues that in contexts, the terms and were not yet in their modern terms were mainly in efforts to the of the world. then, came into its modern form until race be as natural and as to be just as race to our modern of some of the of this in like whether is a form of argument against the exaggerated forms of the distinction is thus we to these terms and the that define as and we how they to the they to should have as in the of we will be less to take for in the of and analytic is to a scholar informed by the history of racism and its interdisciplinary will not to racism by as the epistemological strategy on more between the study of nature and the study of culture. rather need to how the between were as Bernasconi does so in his of the between and biological I only that this argument, it were to be to the of that the guiding argument further by of second argument to the a to the like have critical of the distinction partly it does not appear with in the of common to him and argument, while unlikely to many does someone like as he is in the phenomenological tradition, might have first to and as I in my introduction, I but of this sort to how Robert Bernasconi at some of the important that he but they in the of a as to others should him in Nonetheless, I do not that some of an argument from or other take a more argument from a review of some from and by which Bernasconi purports to that tradition was by no to the that nature is primary it to from its Here the task should be to the history of European philosophy with a view to the the to this task would be The Racial and other texts critical of the social tradition in philosophy of attempted to derive an by the natural this work to be and we should take from Bernasconi no more than the that the of our modern concepts of racism will probably to understand some of the more of the modern academy as of ideologies. important from the work under review is the historical that Bernasconi provides for we are to study something like the history of racism, we will need to our And just as he has that in order to identify the forms of racism our we will need to some study of its In these Critical Philosophy of Race: Essays is at the very least a remarkable I recommend that in race and racism study these articles

Epistemology · Sociology · Critical Race Theory in Education · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Gender Studies · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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