Political Competition in Legislative Elections
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3378048 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Stefan Krasa (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign), Mattias Polborn (0000-0001-7775-1716, Vanderbilt University), Mattias K Polborn |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 112 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 809-825 |
| Publication date | 2018-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0003055418000503 |
| OpenAlex | W291895046 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 50 |
We develop a theory of electoral competition in multidistrict legislative elections when nomination decisions are made by local policy-motivated party members, and voters care about both local and national positions. We show that the asymmetry generated by different national party positions reduces or even entirely removes the competitive pressure to nominate moderate candidates. The model has important implications for our understanding of policy divergence and, in particular, of the effects of gerrymandering
Competition (biology · Democracy · Divergence (linguistics · Economics · Gerrymandering · Legislature · NOMINATE · Nomination · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration
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| Unique citing works | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,67 |
| Citation span | 2014 - 2025 (12) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 8 |