Crossing Over
Majority Party Control Affects Legislator Behavior and the Agenda
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 3586703 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Nicholas G Napolio (0000-0002-8879-0726, Southern California University for Professional Studies, autor de correspondencia), Christian R Grose (0000-0002-3719-3155, Southern California University for Professional Studies, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2022 |
| Volumen | 116 |
| Número | 1 |
| Páginas | 359-366 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2022-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Editorial | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0003055421000721 |
| OpenAlex | W4249301111 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 2 |
| Referencias citadas | 40 |
Does majority party control cause changes in legislative policy making? We argue that majority party floor control affects legislator behavior and agenda control. Leveraging a natural experiment where nearly one tenth of a legislature's members died within the same legislative session, we are able to identify the effect of majority party floor control on the legislative agenda and on legislator choices. Previous correlational work has found mixed evidence of party effects, especially in the mid-twentieth century. In contrast, we find that majority party control leads to (1) changes in the agenda and (2) changes in legislators' revealed preferences. These effects are driven by changes in numerical party majorities on the legislative floor. The effects are strongest with Republican and nonsouthern Democratic legislators. The effects are also more pronounced on the first (economic) than the second (racial) dimension. Additional correlational evidence across 74 years adds external validity to our exogenous evidence
Control (management · Democracy · Economics · Legislation · Legislator · Legislature · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Work (physics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Gender Politics and Representation · Law · Public Administration
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| Obras citantes distintas | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 2 |