Discontent and the Expected Utility of Rebellion
The Case of Peru
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3763409 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Edward N Muller (University of Arizona), Henry Dietz (0000-0002-5878-881X, The University of Texas at Austin), Henry A Dietz, Steven E Finkel (0000-0002-9391-2732, University of Virginia) |
| Year | 1991 |
| Volume | 85 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1261-1282 |
| Publication date | 1991-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/1963945 |
| OpenAlex | W2154285995 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 49 |
| References cited | 19 |
Discontent theories of rebellion postulate that politicized discontent will have a strong independent effect on individuals' potential to participate in rebellious political action. Expected utility theories postulate that participation in rebellious action is motivated by expectation of reward and that discontent is relevant at most only insofar as individuals expect that collective action can be successful and that their participation is important to that end. We test these theories with data from a national sample and a sample of students at a protest-prone university in Peru, a country with significant objective conditions of discontent and a high incidence of rebellious political conflict. The results provide no evidence for the discontent models but strong support for the expected utility models. The potential for participation in rebellious political action proves to be a function primarily of discontentweightedby the expectancy of the action's success and the perceived importance of personal participation. Private social and normative rewards and costs also are relevant-but to a lesser extent-for the individual's calculation of the expected utility of participation
Action (physics · Collective action · Economics · Expectancy theory · Function (biology · Normative · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Sample (material · Sociology · Test (biology · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology · Social Psychology
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| Unique citing works | 49 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,4 |
| Citation span | 1991 - 2023 (33) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 49 |