Exporting Mass Destruction? The Determinants of Dual-Use Trade
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3916067 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Matthew Fuhrmann (0000-0002-7316-0414, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University and Department of Political Science, University of South Carolina, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 45 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 633-652 |
| Publication date | 2008-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Peace Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343308094324 |
| OpenAlex | W1964512323 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 25 |
| References cited | 34 |
This study applies well-known arguments on the effect of conflict, alliances, and democracy on international trade to identify the determinants of dual-use trade. Dual-use commodities are those that can be used in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs or in legitimate civilian applications. This article advances a theory suggesting that governments seeking to maximize the gains from dual-use trade will promote exports to countries where there are security guarantees and restrict exports to countries where security threats exist. Eight hypotheses are tested using data on licensed dual-use exports from the United States to 128 countries between 1991 and 2001. The results indicate that democracy has a positive and significant effect on dual-use exports, while WMD acquisition or pursuit does not necessarily reduce states' access to such commodities. The results vary slightly, based on how dual-use exports are measured. In conducting the first systematic analysis on the determinants of dual-use trade, this study contributes to scholarly understanding of WMD proliferation and research at the nexus of international trade and international security. In particular, it offers important prescriptions for when states are likely to transfer technology that could be used to build WMD. It also encourages further work that disaggregates trade data to examine relationships between particular types of trade and conflict, alliances, free trade agreements, and other political variables
Business · Dual (grammatical number) · Economics · International economics · International trade · Nexus (standard) · Political science · Politics · Trade barrier · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · Engineering · International Relations and Foreign Policy
Blurred Lines
Grand Strategy and the Tools of Economic Statecraft
Supply to Deny
Drone Proliferation and the Challenge of Regulating Dual-Use Technologies
Security Commitments and Nuclear Proliferation
Complying by Denying
France–China cooperation on nuclear energy and artificial intelligence
Endangering alliance or risking proliferation
Almost nuclear
Alliances, state preferences, and trade networks
Splitting Atoms
Emerging Security Technologies and EU Governance
Trade Effects of the Russia–Ukraine Conflict
Spreading Temptation
Disaggregating Noncompliance
Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace
Taking a Walk on the Supply Side
Sanctions and Third-party Compliance with US Foreign Policy Preferences
A Strategic Approach to Nuclear Proliferation
Talking Peace, Making Weapons
The Perils of Predicting Proliferation
Importing the Bomb
Nukes with Numbers
Exporting the Bomb
Microchips and sneakers
The Regionalization of the World Economy
Philosophy and Public Affairs
Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs
Eugene
Ringing in Proliferation
Proliferation Rings
Economic Containment
Does Peace Nurture Democracy
Democratic Trading Partners
Political Similarity and American Foreign Trade Patterns
Understanding Interaction Models
Time Series Intervals and Statistical Inference
The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation
Taking a Walk on the Supply Side
Expanded Trade and GDP Data
Legislators' Personality Traits and Congressional Support for Free Trade
Heterogeneous Trade Interests and Conflict
Tau-b or Not Tau-b
Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion
Event Count Models for International Relations
The (Ir)Relevance of Militarized Interstate Disputes for International Trade
Conflict, Cooperation, and Commerce
Constructing International Politics
Sleeping with the Enemy
Measuring Alliances
Defense Pacts and International Trade
Trading for Security
The Impact of War on Trade
Does Trade Still Follow the Flag
Alliances, Preferential Trading Arrangements, and International Trade
Power Politics and International Trade
The Political Determinants of International Trade
| Unique citing works | 25 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,47 |
| Citation span | 2009 - 2026 (18) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 24 |