Manipulation Cases in Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Part 1

Cases and Arguments

Bibliographic Data

ID4080022
AuthorsGabriel De Marco (0000-0002-5439-0070, University of Oxford), Taylor W Cyr (0000-0002-0500-8496, Samford University)
Year2024
Volume19
Issue12
Pagese70009-e70009
Publication date2024-12-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.70009
PMID39610789
OpenAlexW4404790375
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited134

A common style of argument in the literature on free will and moral responsibility is the Manipulation Argument. These tend to begin with a case of an agent in a deterministic universe who is manipulated, say, via brain surgery, into performing some action. Intuitively, this agent is not responsible for that action. Yet, since there is no relevant difference, with respect to whether an agent is responsible, between the manipulated agent and a typical agent in a deterministic universe, responsibility is not compatible with the truth of determinism. This paper introduces some key types of manipulation cases, the schema for a manipulation argument against compatibilism, the hard-line/soft-line categories of responses to manipulation arguments, and various issues that have become important in discussions of manipulation cases and arguments

Action (physics · Argument (complex analysis · Compatibilism · Determinism · Epistemology · Free will · Incompatibilism · Moral responsibility · Physics · Schema (genetic algorithms · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophy · Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification

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