Why causal facts matter
A critique of Jeppsson’s hard-line reply to four-case manipulation arguments
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21335612 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Samantha L Seybold (0000-0003-2033-5388, Purdue University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 68 |
| Issue | 7 |
| Pages | 2160-2172 |
| Publication date | 2025-08-09 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Inquiry (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/0020174x.2022.2152093 |
| OpenAlex | W4310524391 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 7 |
This paper poses a series of objections to Sofia Jeppsson’s hard-line reply to Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument. According to Jeppsson, the compatibilist can resist Pereboom’s argument by disregarding facts about what caused an agent to act (the ‘causal perspective’) and focusing primarily on the agent’s own perspective of their action (the ‘agential perspective’). Jeppsson argues that we have an obligation to disregard the causal perspective. This is for two reasons: (I) we must disregard the causal facts of the agent’s action, including whether they have been manipulated, since the agent has reason to disregard them; and (II) the causal perspective is not obviously relevant to judgments of moral responsibility. In this paper, I show that both (I) and (II) can be undermined because the causal perspective provides information that is necessary for moral deliberations. This is because it would seem that at least one necessary condition for an agent to be considered morally responsible is that the agent’s actions are not fully controlled by someone else. Since this is information that we can only obtain via the causal perspective, we do not have an obligation to disregard this perspective and so need not accept the compatibilist’s hard-line account
Action (physics) · Argument (complex analysis) · Causal analysis · Compatibilism · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Moral obligation · Moral responsibility · Obligation · Perspective (graphical) · Political science · Sociology · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Law · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification
| Citations per year | 1.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |