Manipulation cases in free will and moral responsibility, part 2

Manipulator‐focused responses

Bibliographic Data

ID7349646
AuthorsGabriel De Marco (0000-0002-5439-0070, University of Oxford), Taylor W Cyr (0000-0002-0500-8496, Samford University)
Year2024
Volume19
Issue12
Pagese70008-e70008
Publication date2024-11-27
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.70008
PMID39618430
OpenAlexW4404833625
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited50

In this paper—Part 2 of 3—we discuss one of the two main types of soft‐line responses to manipulation cases, which we refer to as manipulator‐focused views. Manipulator‐focused views hold, roughly, that the reason that Victim lacks responsibility (or lacks full responsibility) is because of the way the action is related to the Manipulator. First, we introduce these views generally, and then we survey some detailed versions of such views. We then introduce cases of natural forces, often taken to be a problem for such approaches in general, followed by a discussion of various sorts of cases—accidental results, lucky manipulators, and parallel cases—that present challenges for some of the detailed versions of such views. We conclude with some thoughts about the prospects for manipulator‐focused views going forward

Accidental · Action (physics · Manipulator (device · Moral responsibility · Physics · Political science · Robot · Sociology · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Law · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification · Artificial Intelligence

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