Gabriel De Marco
Biographic Data
| ID | 3602073 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Gabriel De Marco |
| GIVEN NAMES | Gabriel |
| FAMILY NAME | De Marco |
| SIGNATURE | DE MARCO G |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Oxford |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5439-0070 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 11 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Manipulation Cases in Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Part 3
In this paper—the last of the series—I discuss the second of the two main types of soft‐line responses to manipulation cases, which I refer to as bypassing views. These views hold that a large part of the reason that Victim lacks responsibility is because the action issues from attitudes acquired in a way that bypassed Victim's capacities for control over their mental life. After offering a quick gloss, I explain how such views are able to avoid …
What makes a medical intervention invasive? A reply to commentaries
What makes a medical intervention invasive
The classification of medical interventions as either invasive or non-invasive is commonly regarded to be morally important. On the most commonly endorsed account of invasiveness, a medical intervention is invasive if and only if it involves either breaking the skin (‘incision’) or inserting an object into the body (‘insertion’). Building on recent discussions of the concept of invasiveness, we show that this standard account fails to capture thr…
On the manipulator-focused response to manipulation cases
In this paper, we identify a class of responses to cases of manipulation that we label manipulator-focused views . The key insight of such views is that being subject to the will of another agent significantly affects our freedom and moral responsibility. Though different authors take this key insight in different directions, and the mechanics of their views are quite different, these views turn out to share many key components, and this allows u…
Manipulation cases in free will and moral responsibility, part 2
In this paper—Part 2 of 3—we discuss one of the two main types of soft‐line responses to manipulation cases, which we refer to as manipulator‐focused views. Manipulator‐focused views hold, roughly, that the reason that Victim lacks responsibility (or lacks full responsibility) is because of the way the action is related to the Manipulator. First, we introduce these views generally, and then we survey some detailed versions of such views. We then …
Manipulation Cases in Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Part 1
A common style of argument in the literature on free will and moral responsibility is the Manipulation Argument. These tend to begin with a case of an agent in a deterministic universe who is manipulated, say, via brain surgery, into performing some action. Intuitively, this agent is not responsible for that action. Yet, since there is no relevant difference, with respect to whether an agent is responsible, between the manipulated agent and a typ…
Nudge Transparency Is Not Required for Nudge Resistibility
In discussions of nudging, transparency is often taken to be important; it is often suggested that a significant moral consideration to take into account when nudging is whether the nudge is transparent. Another consideration taken to be relevant is whether the nudge is easy to resist. Sometimes, these two considerations are taken to be importantly related: if we have reason to make nudges easy to resist, then we have reason to make them transpar…
Historical Moral Responsibility and Manipulation via Deletion
In discussions on moral responsibility for actions, a commonly discussed case is one in which an agent is manipulated into performing some action. On some views, such agents lack responsibility for those actions partly because they issue from attitudes that were acquired in an inappropriate way. In this paper, it is argued that such views are in need of revision. After introducing a new problematic case of a manipulated agent, revisions are offer…
Manipulation, machine induction, and bypassing
A common style of argument in the literature on free will and moral responsibility is the Manipulation Argument. These tend to begin with a case of an agent in a deterministic universe who is manipulated, say, via brain surgery, into performing some action. Intuitively, this agent is not responsible for that action. Yet, since there is no relevant difference, with respect to whether an agent is responsible, between the manipulated agent and a typ…
Nonconsensual neurocorrectives, bypassing, and free action
As neuroscience progresses, we will not only gain a better understanding of how our brains work, but also a better understanding of how to modify them, and as a result, our mental states. An important question we are faced with is whether the state could be justified in implementing such methods on criminal offenders, without their consent, for the purposes of rehabilitation and reduction of recidivism; a practice that is already legal in some ju…
Healthcare, Responsibility and Golden Opportunities
When it comes to determining how healthcare resources should be allocated, there are many factors that could—and perhaps should—be taken into account. One such factor is a patient’s responsibility for his or her illness, or for the behavior that caused it. Policies that take responsibility for the unhealthy lifestyle or its outcomes into account—responsibility-sensitive policies—have faced a series of criticisms. One holds that agents often fail …
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Healthcare, Responsibility and Golden Opportunities
When it comes to determining how healthcare resources should be allocated, there are many factors that could—and perhaps should—be taken into account. One such factor is a patient’s responsibility for his or her illness, or for the behavior that caused it. Policies that take responsibility for the unhealthy lifestyle or its outcomes into account—responsibility-sensitive policies—have faced a series of criticisms. One holds that agents often fail …
Nonconsensual neurocorrectives, bypassing, and free action
As neuroscience progresses, we will not only gain a better understanding of how our brains work, but also a better understanding of how to modify them, and as a result, our mental states. An important question we are faced with is whether the state could be justified in implementing such methods on criminal offenders, without their consent, for the purposes of rehabilitation and reduction of recidivism; a practice that is already legal in some ju…
Nudge Transparency Is Not Required for Nudge Resistibility
In discussions of nudging, transparency is often taken to be important; it is often suggested that a significant moral consideration to take into account when nudging is whether the nudge is transparent. Another consideration taken to be relevant is whether the nudge is easy to resist. Sometimes, these two considerations are taken to be importantly related: if we have reason to make nudges easy to resist, then we have reason to make them transpar…
Historical Moral Responsibility and Manipulation via Deletion
In discussions on moral responsibility for actions, a commonly discussed case is one in which an agent is manipulated into performing some action. On some views, such agents lack responsibility for those actions partly because they issue from attitudes that were acquired in an inappropriate way. In this paper, it is argued that such views are in need of revision. After introducing a new problematic case of a manipulated agent, revisions are offer…
Manipulation, machine induction, and bypassing
A common style of argument in the literature on free will and moral responsibility is the Manipulation Argument. These tend to begin with a case of an agent in a deterministic universe who is manipulated, say, via brain surgery, into performing some action. Intuitively, this agent is not responsible for that action. Yet, since there is no relevant difference, with respect to whether an agent is responsible, between the manipulated agent and a typ…
What makes a medical intervention invasive? A reply to commentaries
What makes a medical intervention invasive
The classification of medical interventions as either invasive or non-invasive is commonly regarded to be morally important. On the most commonly endorsed account of invasiveness, a medical intervention is invasive if and only if it involves either breaking the skin (‘incision’) or inserting an object into the body (‘insertion’). Building on recent discussions of the concept of invasiveness, we show that this standard account fails to capture thr…
On the manipulator-focused response to manipulation cases
In this paper, we identify a class of responses to cases of manipulation that we label manipulator-focused views . The key insight of such views is that being subject to the will of another agent significantly affects our freedom and moral responsibility. Though different authors take this key insight in different directions, and the mechanics of their views are quite different, these views turn out to share many key components, and this allows u…
Manipulation cases in free will and moral responsibility, part 2
In this paper—Part 2 of 3—we discuss one of the two main types of soft‐line responses to manipulation cases, which we refer to as manipulator‐focused views. Manipulator‐focused views hold, roughly, that the reason that Victim lacks responsibility (or lacks full responsibility) is because of the way the action is related to the Manipulator. First, we introduce these views generally, and then we survey some detailed versions of such views. We then …
Manipulation Cases in Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Part 1
A common style of argument in the literature on free will and moral responsibility is the Manipulation Argument. These tend to begin with a case of an agent in a deterministic universe who is manipulated, say, via brain surgery, into performing some action. Intuitively, this agent is not responsible for that action. Yet, since there is no relevant difference, with respect to whether an agent is responsible, between the manipulated agent and a typ…
Manipulation Cases in Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Part 3
In this paper—the last of the series—I discuss the second of the two main types of soft‐line responses to manipulation cases, which I refer to as bypassing views. These views hold that a large part of the reason that Victim lacks responsibility is because the action issues from attitudes acquired in a way that bypassed Victim's capacities for control over their mental life. After offering a quick gloss, I explain how such views are able to avoid …
Psychology (10 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Free Will and Agency (8 works) · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations (7 works) · Epistemology (6 works) · Moral responsibility (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (5 works) · Sociology (5 works) · Artificial Intelligence (4 works)