On the manipulator-focused response to manipulation cases
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21371174 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gabriel De Marco (0000-0002-5439-0070, University of Oxford, corresponding author), Taylor W Cyr (0000-0002-0500-8496, Samford University) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 181 |
| Issue | 11 |
| Pages | 2867-2896 |
| Publication date | 2024-11-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8116 • E-ISSN: 1573-0883 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11098-024-02218-3 |
| PMID | 39618826 |
| OpenAlex | W4403401132 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 44 |
In this paper, we identify a class of responses to cases of manipulation that we label manipulator-focused views . The key insight of such views is that being subject to the will of another agent significantly affects our freedom and moral responsibility. Though different authors take this key insight in different directions, and the mechanics of their views are quite different, these views turn out to share many key components, and this allows us to discuss several authors’ views at the same time, highlighting a variety of challenges for such views and helping to identify pitfalls to avoid in further developments of views of this type. Moreover, as we survey manipulator-focused views and the challenges that plague them, we go beyond the typical problem cases for such views—natural force variations of manipulation cases—and introduce several new manipulation cases. We conclude by comparing the prospects for this family of views with its main rival, namely bypassing views
Class (philosophy) · Computer security · Engineering ethics · Epistemology · Key (lock) · Manipulator (device) · Metaphysics · Philosophy of mind · Robot · Sociology · Variety (cybernetics) · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Engineering · Free Will and Agency · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Elbow room
Living without Free Will
Causation and Free Will
Free Will and Luck
Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life
The Intransitivity of Causation Revealed in Equations and Graphs
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility
Manipulation Arguments and Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
Historical Moral Responsibility and Manipulation via Deletion
Why the manipulation argument fails
Responsibility and the ‘Pie Fallacy’
Manipulation, machine induction, and bypassing
Nonconsensual neurocorrectives, bypassing, and free action
Why causal facts matter
Spontaneous Freedom
Autonomous Agents
Agency, Teleological Control and Robust Causation
Indoctrination, Coercion and Freedom of Will
Sensitive and Insensitive Causation
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2025 (2) |
| Highly cited | No |