Low Fertility and the State

The Efficacy of Policy

Bibliographic Data

ID4119840
AuthorsPeter Mcdonald (0009-0004-5842-4444)
Year2006
Volume32
Issue3
Pages485-510
Publication date2006-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePopulation and Development Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0098-7921 • E-ISSN: 1728-4457
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1728-4457.2006.00134.x
OpenAlexW2141582218
LanguageEN
Citations received224
References cited50

SOME 30 COUNTRIES today have fertility rates below 1.5 births per woman.The governments of each of these countries have reported to the United Nations that they consider this rate to be "too low" (United Nations 2004).When fertility is moderately below replacement level, the size of subsequent generations falls only slowly and, if considered necessary, there is an opportunity to supplement the generation size with migration.When fertility remains very low, however, the generation size falls rapidly and massive migration would be required to offset the decline (United Nations 2000).Hence, we can think in terms of a "safety zone" for low fertility.Population dynamics tends to confirm the view of governments that the "safety zone" lies above 1.5 births per woman.There is evidence also that very low fertility, on average, is counter to the preferences of individuals experiencing it (van Peer 2002; d'Addio and d'Ercole 2005).While individual-level economic analysis attributes meaning only to revealed preferences, actual fertility behavior (a revealed preference) is achieved within a given social-institutional setting.In expressing higher "ideal preferences" on average, women are effectively commenting upon the nature of the social-institutional setting in which they consider having children.They are saying that, in a different institutional setting, they believe they would have had more children.My central argument in this article is that institutional settings more conducive to having children are both desirable and achievable.People have many desires that are not satisfied.Why be concerned about this particular unrealized ideal?I shall argue that benefits accrue both to the individuals concerned and to the society as a whole if fertility ideals can come closer to being fulfilled.There are severe questions about the nature of social organization if citizens fail to have the number of children they would prefer to have when that number is as low as one, two, or three children.The argument is a subtle one because the societies under discussion do not remove the right to have children as some societies remove other personal freedoms.Rather, the argument I make is that ideals go unre

Bust · Context (archaeology) · Fertility · Political science · Population · Sociology · State (computer science) · Demography · Family Dynamics and Relationships · Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics · Global Health Care Issues · History

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