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Who ought to be elected and who is actually elected? An empirical investigation of 92 elections under three procedures

Bibliographic Data

ID4170355
AuthorsDan S Felsenthal (0000-0002-7713-7246, Carmel (Israel)), Moshé Machover (King's College London)
Year1995
Volume14
Issue2
Pages143-169
Publication date1995-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueElectoral Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0261-3794 • E-ISSN: 1873-6890
PublisherElsevier BV (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1016/0261-3794(94)00019-6
OpenAlexW1970831923
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited43

Ceteris paribus · Contingent vote · Discontinuity (linguistics · Economics · Group voting ticket · Microeconomics · Political science · Preference · Profit (economics · Regression discontinuity design · Statistics · Voting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Mathematics · Psychology · Social Psychology

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  • Who's Afraid of the Big Bad Cycle? Evidence from 36 Elections

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  • A Comparison of Efficiency of Multicandidate Electoral Systems

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  • An Empirical Evaluation of Six Voting Procedures

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    Open Access•L Feld, Scott L Feld et al.•Rationality and Society•1990

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  • Tacit co-operation in three-alternative non-cooperative voting games

    Open Access•Dan S Felsenthal, Amnon Rapoport et al.•Electoral Studies•1988

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Unique citing works5
Citations per year0,21
Citation span2002 - 2018 (17)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 5

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