How to think about the Modularity of Mind-Reading

Bibliographic Data

ID4960692
AuthorsGregory Currie (0000-0001-8364-997X, University of Nottingham), Kim Sterelny (0000-0003-3159-6698, Victoria University of Wellington)
Year2000
Volume50
Issue199
Pages145-160
Publication date2000-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/1467-9213.00176
OpenAlexW2089730509
LanguageEN
Citations received11
References cited13

It has been suggested that the fixation of beliefs about people’s beliefs, desires and intentions is modularized. We argue that this is unlikely. We argue that there is modularity lower down: social‐intentional ‘markers’ are produced by an encapsulated mechanism intermediate between perception and belief‐fixation, and that these markers make a distinctive contribution to the fixation of beliefs about the mental. But belief fixation itself is not modular. Finally, we suggest some complications to our simple picture, and some ways in which our thesis might shed light on pathologies of social understanding

Biology · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Evolutionary biology · Linguistics · Modularity (biology) · Reading (process) · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Language, Metaphor, and Cognition · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

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