More than a Question of Agency
Privatized Project Implementation, Accountabilities, and Global Environmental Governance
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4983709 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jonathan Rosenberg (0000-0002-1531-6572, Illinois Institute of Technology, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 10-30 |
| Publication date | 2017-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Review of Policy Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1541-132X • E-ISSN: 1541-1338 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ropr.12209 |
| OpenAlex | W2571834996 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 12 |
| References cited | 31 |
With limited success, international relations scholars have used principal-agent theory (P-A) to understand gaps in global governance. While P-A may not provide robust explanations, it is still useful for mapping long chains of complex, boundary-crossing relationships and locating the gaps that characterize global environmental governance (GEG). In this article, first I argue that we can get beyond merely locating and describing governance gaps, and start explaining them, by considering the problems of accountability that contribute to those gaps. Second, I argue that outsourced sustainable development projects, implemented by for-profit contractors, provide an under-studied and under-theorized body of cases for examining the relationship between agency and accountability. Finally, I use the example of a United States Agency for International Development post-hurricane recovery project in Grenada to suggest that when development assistance agencies privatize implementation they prioritize more economistic logics of accountability. As a result, they may enhance short-term economic efficiency and even become more accountable to their principals. But they fail to connect the means and ends of GEG, despite firmly stated, official commitments to "taking the environment into account
Accountability · Business · Corporate governance · Economics · Environmental governance · Global governance · International development · Political science · Principal–agent problem · Sociology · Sustainable development · International Development and Aid · Law · Public Administration · Public-Private Partnership Projects · Regulation and Compliance Studies · Finance
Mission Interference
The impacts of marketization on international aid
Toward “hardened” accountability? Analyzing the European Union's hybrid transnational governance in timber and biofuel supply chains
Constructing a routine accountability mechanism
What Configuration Can Trigger Pro-Environmental Policy Agenda Setting in an Uncertain Social Context
What do Private Companies Prioritise When Implementing International Development Projects? Evidence from Four Central and Eastern European Donors
A Quest for State Contracts
NGO Accountability
Introduction
Institutional Accountability of Nonstate Actors in the UNFCCC
Nepa and National Trends in Federal Infrastructure Siting in the United States
Accountability Challenges in the Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change
Delegation under anarchy
Agency Theory
Public Opinion and Foreign Aid
Accountability in Global Environmental Governance
Transparency for Whom? Information Disclosure and Power in Global Environmental Governance
The Governance of Transnational Environmental Harm
Public accountability
Convergence or Convenience? International Conservation NGOs and Development Assistance in Tanzania
Rethinking Democratic Accountability
Contracting for Development
Development Capital
Reinventing Government Accountability
The Transformation of Governance
Principal-Agent Models
Governing the Hollow State
Principal-Agent Problems in Humanitarian Intervention
World Bank Environmental Reform
Delegation to International Organizations
The Privatization of Global Environmental Governance
Introduction
Where Does the Money Go? Best and Worst Practices in Foreign Aid
Greening the mainstream
Institutional Accountability of Nonstate Actors in the UNFCCC
Judicialization of Environmental Policy and the Crisis of Democratic Accountability
Agency Theory
Outsourcing and the Contracting of Responsibility
| Unique citing works | 12 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,33 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2026 (10) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 11 |