The paradox of regulatory discretion
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6089772 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Despoina Mantzari (0000-0001-6024-0012, Faculty of Laws University College London London UK, corresponding author), Francesca Pia Vantaggiato (0000-0003-1154-4540, Department of Political Economy King's College London London UK) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 382-403 |
| Publication date | 2020-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Law & Policy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0265-8240 • E-ISSN: 1467-9930 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/lapo.12158 |
| OpenAlex | W3097884385 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 46 |
Regulatory authorities in the utilities sector typically employ economic evidence and analysis to make expert discretionary judgments under uncertainty. However, economic analysis does not provide clear answers regarding policy outcomes. This exposes regulators to environmental uncertainty, that is, uncertainty regarding the reactions of other actors in the institutional system to their decisions. When policy outcome and environmental uncertainty are high, discretion takes center stage. Will regulators pursue the course of action suggested by economic analysis and their expert judgment or not? What explains this choice? To answer these questions, we carry out a comparative analysis of three British regulatory authorities in the utilities sector: the Office of Communications, the Office of Gas and Electricity, and the Water Services Regulation Authority. We consider two key sectoral and organizational characteristics: the extent of market competition, and statutory discretion. We rely on interview evidence and documentary analysis and a principal–agent framework. Our analysis reveals a paradox: when environmental and policy outcome uncertainty are high, the higher the regulatory discretion, the lower the role of economic expertise in regulatory decisions. Our findings call for a normative reflection on the role of expertise in regulated sectors
Business · Discretion · Economics · Market economy · Normative · Political science · Principal (computer security · Public economics · Regulatory reform · Statutory law · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Policy and Administration Research · Regulation and Compliance Studies
Factors affecting judicial review of regulatory appeals
Styles of regulatory discretion
Clashes and agreements between regulatory agencies and courts
Conceptualization and measurement of regulatory discretion
Norms, institutions, and digital veils of uncertainty—Do network protocols need trust anyway
Regulatory conflict and a latent public safety risk? The case of gas infrastructure
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy
Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in General and with Respect to Catv
Political Institutions
Three Types of Perceived Uncertainty about the Environment
Economy and Society
IX.—Essentially Contested Concepts
Economy and Society
The Same, But Different
Utility and regulatory decision-making under conditions of uncertainty
The impact of electricity market reform on consumers
Rationality, emotions, and social norms
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission
Non‐Discrimination Clauses in the Retail Energy Sector
The UK Domestic Gas Electricity (Tariff Cap) Act
The rise of the regulatory state in Europe
Network Governance and Multi-level Delegation
Regulatory strategies, delegation and European market integration
Liberalizing telecommunications in Europe
Business-Regulatory Relations
Delegating Powers in the European Community
A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice
Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions
Learning from the Americanists (Again)
The Principal–Agent Framework and Independent Regulatory Agencies
Integrating Delegation into the Policy Theory Literature
From the Positive to the Regulatory State
Transactional Authority and Bureaucratic Politics
Predicting Public Sector Accountability
The Usage of Scientific Knowledge by Independent Regulatory Agencies
Formal Models of Bureaucracy
Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion
A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion
Congressional Oversight Overlooked
The interest ecology of financial regulation
Political Control Versus Expertise
Of Time and Space
Interorganizational Relations
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1.2 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2025 (5) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |