The When and Why of Nominations
Determinants of Presidential Appointments
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6180144 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gary E Hollibaugh (0000-0001-9844-2437, University of Notre Dame, corresponding author), Lawrence S Rothenberg (0000-0003-2788-5585, University of Rochester) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 45 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 280-303 |
| Publication date | 2017-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Politics Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1532-673X • E-ISSN: 1552-3373 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1532673x16628266 |
| OpenAlex | W3125663870 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 19 |
| References cited | 44 |
Scholars interested in bargaining over political appointments typically analyze the duration between the candidate’s nomination and eventual disposition, ignoring the prior period between vacancy and nomination. Using a dataset of vacancies reported to the Government Accountability Office, we instead examine the nomination stage. We uncover both commonalities and differences between the dynamics of nomination and those of confirmation. Ideological divergence between the President and the Senate filibuster pivot tends to delay nominations but only under divided government. Presidents not only move more quickly on more important positions, but are also influenced by the ideological leanings of the agencies
Accountability · Ideology · Law and economics · Nomination · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research
Presidential Strategy amidst the “Broken” Appointments Process
Going for Goals
Prioritizing Judicial Nominations after Presidential Transitions
Party Defection in Senate Confirmations of Executive Nominees
Executive policymaking influence via the administrative apparatus
Appointee vacancies in US executive branch agencies
Presidential directives in a resistant bureaucracy
Agency control through the appointed hierarchy
Appointments and attrition
Do Vacancies Hurt Federal Agency Performance
The Incompetence Trap
The Who, When, and Where of Executive Nominations
The Longer You Wait, the Longer It Takes
Competition or Collusion? How Presidents and the Senate Evade or Enforce Statutory Requirements for Ambassadorial Nominees
Studying Bureaucracy in a Diverse Democracy
Quick to Judge? Confirmation by Cloture in the Post-Nuclear Senate
Control without Confirmation
As sabatinas dos indicados ao TCU no pós-1988
The confirmation hearings of appointees to the Brazilian Federal Court of Accounts post-1988
The Politics of Presidential Appointments
The Efficiency of Cox's Likelihood Function for Censored Data
Nonparametric Estimation from Incomplete Observations
Regression Models and Life-Tables
Pivotal Politics
Senate Gate-Keeping, Presidential Staffing of “Inferior Offices,” and the Ideological Composition of Appointments to the Public Bureaucracy
Pivotal Politics, Presidential Capital, and Supreme Court Nominations
The Invisible Presidential Appointments
The Appointments Process and the Administrative Presidency
Staffing Alone
The Political Determinants of Ambassadorial Appointments
Experiential Learning and Presidential Management of the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy
Changing minds? Not in Congress
The Triumph of Loyalty Over Competence
A Unified Theory of U.S. Lawmaking
Recovering a Basic Space From a Set of Issue Scales
Naive Cronyism and Neutral Competence
Advice and Consent
Dividers, Not Uniters
The Changing Dynamics of Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees
Presidential Capital and the Supreme Court Confirmation Process
Recommendations for an Effective 2008 Transition
Senatorial Discourtesy
Expert Opinion, Agency Characteristics, and Agency Preferences
Female and Minority Judicial Nominees
Vacancies, vetting, and votes
Federal employee unionization and presidential control of the bureaucracy
Executive appointments
Nonproportional Hazards and Event History Analysis in International Relations
Comparable Preference Estimates across Time and Institutions for the Court, Congress, and Presidency
Slackers and Zealots
Time is of the Essence
Delaying Justice(s)
Duration Models and Proportional Hazards in Political Science
Parametric Models, Duration Dependence, and Time-Varying Data Revisited
The Logic of Collective Inaction
Separated Powers in the United States
Presidents and Patronage
The Changing Politics of Federal Judicial Nominations
Politicizing Priority Departments
The Increasing Senate Scrutiny of Lower Federal Court Nominees
From Abe Fortas to Zoë Baird
Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees
| Unique citing works | 19 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,9 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2026 (11) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 19 |