Agency control through the appointed hierarchy
Presidential Politicization of Unilateral Appointees
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6296201 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gary E Hollibaugh (0000-0001-9844-2437, University of Pittsburgh, corresponding author), Lawrence S Rothenberg (0000-0003-2788-5585, University of Rochester) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 44 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 44-66 |
| Publication date | 2024-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Public Policy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0143-814X • E-ISSN: 1469-7815 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0143814x23000272 |
| OpenAlex | W4387777215 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 46 |
Schedule C and noncareer Senior Executive Service positions hold significant influence over policy outcomes, yet they have received limited scrutiny compared to advise and consent (PAS) appointments. Such appointments offer understudied avenues for presidential control over the bureaucracy. Through a comprehensive analysis of more detailed data than has been employed to date, we reveal that these appointments are responsive to broader political dynamics, particularly those relevant to PAS appointments, including inter- and intrabranch conflicts, agency ideology, Senate workload, and the political calendar. However, statutory constraints and agency characteristics – such as the managerial expertise of appointed agency leadership – also shape their utilization. While unilateral appointments provide an advantage to Presidents, executives are constrained when using them to overcome legislative opposition or reshape resistant agencies. These lower-level appointments reflect the wider political landscape, granting the President significant – but not unrestrained – opportunities to exert influence on both the bureaucracy and policy outcomes
Agency (philosophy · Bureaucracy · Economics · Ideology · Legislature · Management · Opposition (politics · Political science · Politics · Presidential system · Public relations · Scrutiny · Sociology · Statutory law · Workload · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political and Economic history of UK and US · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research
A government of strangers
Calling the Shots
The Politics of Presidential Appointments
Fitting Fully Observed Recursive Mixed-process Models with cmp
Senate Gate-Keeping, Presidential Staffing of “Inferior Offices,” and the Ideological Composition of Appointments to the Public Bureaucracy
Quitting in Protest
Protection Versus Flexibility
The Invisible Presidential Appointments
The Politicization Conversation
Revisiting the Administrative Presidency
Polarization, Excepted Appointments, and the Administrative Presidency
The Missing Element
Short-Timers
Experiential Learning and Presidential Management of the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy
The Triumph of Loyalty Over Competence
Political Management Strategies and Polical/Career Relationships
Rethinking Loyalty and Competence in Presidential Appointments
In the Web of Politics
Behind the Curve
Recovering a Basic Space From a Set of Issue Scales
Naive Cronyism and Neutral Competence
Advice and Consent
Testing Pendleton's Premise
Politicization and Responsiveness in Executive Agencies
Establishing the Bush Presidency
Expert Opinion, Agency Characteristics, and Agency Preferences
The Structure of Appointment Politics
Vacancies, vetting, and votes
Now or later? A dynamic analysis of judicial appointments
Federal employee unionization and presidential control of the bureaucracy
Executive appointments
Appointments and attrition
Executive Control and Turnover in the Senior Executive Service
Elections, Ideology, and Turnover in the US Federal Government
Amateur Government
The Who, When, and Where of Executive Nominations
The Logic of Collective Inaction
Presidents and Patronage
The Allocation of Excepted Political Positions
The When and Why of Nominations
Control without Confirmation
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |