The Role of Economic Reliance in Defense Procurement Contracting
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6180289 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Rebecca U Thorpe (Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C), Rebecca Thorpe (Brookings Institution, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 636-675 |
| Publication date | 2010-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Politics Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1532-673X • E-ISSN: 1552-3373 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1532673x09337107 |
| OpenAlex | W2023648921 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 34 |
This article examines how a defense sector presence in sparsely populated areas influences (a) House of Representatives defense committee assignments and (2) defense procurement allocations from 1999 to 2005. Although previous work had shown that prime contracts typically flow to headquarter locations, this article goes beyond existing research by tracking the distribution of defense expenditures to major subcontracting locations. In doing so, I find a conditional relationship between defense industry presence and rural geography: Defense funds disproportionately flow to congressional districts that are more economically reliant on the defense sector of the economy. Constituency dependence on the defense sector is one of the most important factors leading members of Congress to seek representation on defense committees and to procure defense benefits. Local dependence on the defense industry may reinforce political relationships that contribute to inefficiency and excess in weapons contracting
Business · Civil defense · Defence industry · Defense industry · Economic policy · Economics · Inefficiency · Management · Market economy · Political science · Politics · Procurement · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law · Public Procurement and Policy · Marketing
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Geographic Politics in the U.S. House of Representatives
The reciprocal relationship between state defense interest and committee representation in Congress
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Party and Committee in Distributive Politics
Testing the Parochial Hypothesis
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Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions
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Heterogeneity and Representation
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| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,46 |
| Citation span | 2013 - 2021 (9) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |