Coalition bargaining in four games that include a veto player
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6200313 |
|---|---|
| Authors | J Keith Murnighan (Federal Agency for Scientific Organizations, corresponding author), Eugene Szwajkowski |
| Year | 1979 |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue | 11 |
| Pages | 1933-1946 |
| Publication date | 1979-11-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3514 • E-ISSN: 1939-1315 |
| Publisher | American Psychological Association (APA) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1037/0022-3514.37.11.1933 |
| OpenAlex | W4253064977, W2007832493 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 10 |
Political science · Politics · Veto · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Merger and Competition Analysis · Psychology · Social Psychology
Statistical principles in experimental design.
A bargaining theory of coalition formation.
Markets with a Continuum of Traders
Effects of situational variables and opponent concessions on a bargainer's perception, aspirations, and concessions
Theories and processes of coalition formation
Large Group Bargaining in a Characteristic Function Game
Behavior, communication, and assumptions about other people's behavior in a commons dilemma situation
A test of the bargaining theory of coalition formation in four-person groups
A Theory of Coalition Formation
Committee Decisions under Majority Rule
| Citations per year | 0.07 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1980 - 1985 (6) |
| Highly cited | No |