Costly Adjustments, Markets and International Reassurance
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6229338 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Johannes Urpelainen (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 679-704 |
| Publication date | 2012-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | British Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-1234 • E-ISSN: 1469-2112 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s000712341200004x |
| OpenAlex | W2068168246 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 52 |
Two leaders engaged in international co-operation must each build trust by credibly signalling that they will not exploit the other by defecting at the implementation stage. Previous research does not reveal the difficulty and cost of such international reassurance. The role that costly adjustments by markets play in international reassurance is analysed, showing that fully efficient information revelation can be achieved when market actors under intense competitive pressures undergo sufficiently costly adjustments in expectation of international co-operation. ‘Nice’ leaders can reveal their true preferences simply by saying they intend to co-operate, because ‘mean’ leaders are unwilling to mislead market actors into undergoing futile costly adjustments. However, market imperfections prevent full information revelation unless market actors prefer international co-operation to the status quo
Business · Computer security · Economics · Exploit · Industrial organization · International market · International trade · Market economy · Order (exchange · Revelation · Status quo · Computer Science · Economic Policies and Impacts · Finance · Global Financial Regulation and Crises · Risk Management in Financial Firms
Industry and trade in some developing countries
How International Law Works
Empowering Exporters
Reputation, Compliance, and International Law
Strategic Information Transmission
Political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy
Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
Environmental and technology policies for climate mitigation
The Logic of Political Survival
Do bilateral investment treaties increase foreign direct investment to developing countries
Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments
Eliciting Substance from ‘Hot Air
International Organization as a Seal of Approval
Social Movements and Industry Development
Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes
The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy
The Security Dilemma Revisited
The Politics of Linkage
Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy
Self-Interest and Environmental Management
Domestic reform as a rationale for gradualism in international cooperation
Signaling Foreign Policy Interests
Regulation under Economic Globalization1
Why Should I Believe You? The Costs and Consequences of Bilateral Investment Treaties
War, Peace, and the Invisible Hand
Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation
Crisis prevention and the Austrian State Treaty
Coercion Through IOs
Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation
Rationalist explanations for war
Negotiation arithmetic
The interest-based explanation of international environmental policy
Global Markets and National Politics
Democratization and International Organizations
Before Hegemony
An economic theory of mutually advantageous issue linkages in international negotiations
Positive Feedback
Investing in the Peace
The Limits of Design
The Capitalist Peace
Reciprocity in international relations
The Coming Global Climate-Technology Revolution
Reassurance in International Conflict Management
Efficient Secrecy
When Can Mediators Build Trust
International Crises and Domestic Politics
Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,29 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2024 (6) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |