Sectors, Pollution, and Trade
How Industrial Interests Shape Domestic Positions on Global Climate Agreements
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6272772 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Federica Genovese (0000-0002-7107-2744, University of Essex, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 63 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 819-836 |
| Publication date | 2019-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-8833 • E-ISSN: 1468-2478 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/isq/sqz062 |
| OpenAlex | W2927329950 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 32 |
| References cited | 33 |
It is usually assumed that the cost of abating pollution is the main deterrent of domestic support for international climate cooperation. In particular, some scholars have argued that, due to the burden of pollution abatement, businesses commonly constrain governments, which then take less cooperative positions on global climate agreements. I suggest that this argument needs further qualification: pollution-related costs rarely have unconditional effects on preferences for global climate agreements. Instead, a sector's pollution level is more likely to influence preferences for climate cooperation if mediated by its trade exposure. If pollution is high, firms in high-trade sectors may be less able to absorb climate regulation, and hence they should be more sensitive to climate cooperation. If pollution is low, firms in high-trade sectors may support climate cooperation, because by being more efficient they are more capable of adjusting to regulation. These dynamics should then affect governmental positions on global climate politics. I test my sectoral argument with original data from business statements and national communications at the United Nations climate negotiations. In line with my argument, I find that businesses in trade-open sectors are more likely to oppose climate agreement as their sector's emissions increase. I also find that in countries where high-emission sectors are open to trade, governments have low preferences for climate cooperation. The findings have implications for the domestic politics of environmental agreements and the distributive politics of global public good provision
Argument (complex analysis · Business · Climate change · Economics · International economics · International trade · Negotiation · Political science · Politics · Climate Change Policy and Economics · Energy, Environment, and Transportation Policies · Energy, Environment, Economic Growth
Global harms, local profits
Explaining green industrial policy in an age of globalization
Green rhetoric, anti-environmental voting
Climate Exposure Drives Firm Political Behavior
Conserving What’s Left
Political strategies for climate and environmental solutions
Driving decarbonization? Corporate responses to the Paris climate agreement in the global automotive sector
How domestic political context shapes the topics in UNFCCC conference of the parties decisions, 1995–2023
Prisoners of the Wrong Dilemma
The Enduring Credibility Challenge of Long-Term Global Environmental Policy
Beliefs About Consequences from Climate Action Under Weak Climate Institutions
Tracking Climate Securitization
The limits of green concertation
Commendable climate action or protectionist overreach? Contesting the EU’s trade-related climate policies at the WTO
Is trade the enemy of environment
Conditional Effects of the Spotlight
From Gridlock to Ratchet
Reflections on Applying Systems Thinking to Stakeholder Mapping
Fighting the Future
What's in a Polity? Political Institutions and Varieties of Economic Interventionism in the United States and the European Union
Introducing Principles and Standards for Responsible Investment
Energy transition, financial markets and EU interventionism
Anarchy, Nature, and Innovation
From a cultural to a distributive issue
Climate regulation’s effects on businesses and public support for climate action
On the eve of ecological transition? The failed institutionalization of sustainable development in Italy (1992–2020)
Does Institutional Proliferation Undermine Cooperation? Theory and Evidence from Climate Change
The Enemy of My Enemy
The home state effect
Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Global Warming
Extreme weather and climate policy
Creating Climate Coalitions
Global Warming Gridlock
Carbon Coalitions
The Rescaling of Global Environmental Politics
Institutions and Economic Performance
Is There a Democracy–Civil Society Paradox in Global Environmental Governance
Oppose, Support, or Hedge? Distributional Effects, Regulatory Pressure, and Business Strategy in Environmental Politics
A climate for business
Are left-wing party strength and corporatism good for the environment? Evidence from panel analysis of air pollution in OECD countries
Trade Induced Technical Change? The Impact of Chinese Imports on Innovation, IT and Productivity
International Relations as a Social Science
Structural Topic Models for Open‐Ended Survey Responses
Electric utilities and American climate policy
Expanded Trade and GDP Data
The interest-based explanation of international environmental policy
International Trade and Environmental Policy in the Postcommunist World
Treating Words as Data with Error
A Scaling Model for Estimating Time‐Series Party Positions from Texts
Costly Adjustments, Markets and International Reassurance
Interests, Norms and Support for the Provision of Global Public Goods
Who and what are carbon markets for? Politics and the development of climate policy
States' interests at international climate negotiations
Environmental diplomacy
Democratic Electoral Systems around the world, 1946-2011
Firms in International Trade
Optimal Obfuscation
| Unique citing works | 32 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 5,33 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 31 |