A Generalized Model of Voting One Issue at a Time with Applications to Congress
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6231771 |
|---|---|
| Authors | James M Enelow (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1984 |
| Volume | 28 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 587 |
| Publication date | 1984-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2110906 |
| OpenAlex | W2332891297 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 4 |
Earlier work by Enelow and Hinich that develops a theory of how voter expectations affect preferences on a single issue is extended by building into the model a dependence between futureissue decisions and present alternatives. It is assumed that each voter forecasts future issue decisions with a multidimensional random variable whose mean is linear in the alternatives of the present issue. If voters have quadratic utility (i.e., are risk-averse) and maximize expected utility, it is shown that symmetric, single-peaked preferences are induced on each issue based on the preference and forecast parameters of each voter. Consequently, an equilibrium decision exists on each issue. This equilibrium is a generalization of the one derived by Enelow and Hinich. The author argues that the model developed in the paper is useful for representing and providing insights into the type of single-issue voting that occurs in Congress, and demonstrates through examples both that the problem addressed by the model arises frequently in congressional voting and that the assumption of a linear dependence between present alternatives and mean forecasts on future issues is reasonable in many real world instances of congressional decision making
Econometrics · Economics · Expected utility hypothesis · Generalization · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Preference · Voting · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Mathematics
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,15 |
| Citation span | 1986 - 1996 (11) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |