Sequential Voting with Endogenous Voter Forecasts
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3353346 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Dennis Epple (0000-0002-7354-5728, Carnegie Mellon University), Joseph B Kadane (0000-0003-1548-5912, Carnegie Mellon University) |
| Year | 1990 |
| Volume | 84 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 165-175 |
| Publication date | 1990-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/1963635 |
| OpenAlex | W2085314909 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 16 |
We investigate a sequential voting model in which voters' forecasts of outcomes on future issues are determined endogenously. Voters are assumed to make decisions in an environment in which future outcomes are uncertain. The uncertainty arises from two possible sources. Voters may be uncertain of other voters' preferences. In addition, events that occur before future issues are decided may affect voters' preferences on future votes. Information available to voters at each point in time is characterized. An equilibrium to the voting problem, if one exists, is one for which the outcome on the issue currently being decided and voters' forecasts of outcomes on future issues are determined simultaneously. We show that an equilibrium exists under a particular voting institution and characterize voters' forecasts for this equilibrium
Affect (linguistics · Anti-plurality voting · Bullet voting · Cardinal voting systems · Disapproval voting · Economics · Institution · Microeconomics · Outcome (game theory · Point (geometry · Political science · Politics · Voting · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Mathematics · Psychology
A dynamical model of political equilibrium
Agreeing to Disagree
Elections with limited information
Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements
Sequential Equilibria
Advances in the spatial theory of voting
The Theory of Committees and Elections
Agendas, Strategic Voting, and Signaling with Incomplete Information
Structure-Induced Equilibria and Perfect-Foresight Expectations
Information Transmission in Debate
A Generalized Model of Voting One Issue at a Time with Applications to Congress
Sequential Elections with Limited Information
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for a Majority Winner in n-Dimensional Spatial Voting Games
Voting One Issue at a Time
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,05 |
| Citation span | 1989 - 1996 (8) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |