Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for a Majority Winner in n-Dimensional Spatial Voting Games
An Intuitive Geometric Approach
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6230080 |
|---|---|
| Authors | L Feld (0000-0003-4820-1365), Scott L Feld, B Grofman (0000-0002-2801-3351) |
| Year | 1987 |
| Volume | 31 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 709 |
| Publication date | 1987-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2111221 |
| OpenAlex | W2317678631 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 23 |
| References cited | 15 |
Necessary and sufficient conditions for there to be a majority winner in n-dimensional spatial voting games are well known, but they are customarily stated in symbolic terms in a fashion which is virtually incomprehensible to those without some reasonable degree of mathematical training, and the proofs of the basic results are even less accessible to the nonmathematically sophisticated reader. We offer proofs of the key results in this area restricted to the important case where voter preferences are a simple function of distance, that is, where, in a choice between any two alternatives, voters prefer the alternative that is closer to their ideal outcome. Our proofs, unlike those customary in the literature, can be understood by anyone who can remember high school geometry. The nature of our proofs is such as to show how the basic n-dimensional results, including the Plott (1967) conditions, the Kramer (1973) sequential voting theorem, the McKelvey (1976, 1979) agenda manipulation result, the Shepsle (1979) germaneness restriction result, and the McCubbins and Schwartz (1985) budget constraint result, can all be derived as reasonably straightforward extensions of Duncan Black's famous median voter result in the one-dimensional case
Constraint (computer-aided design · Epistemology · Function (biology · Geometry · Ideal (ethics · Mathematical economics · Mathematical proof · Outcome (game theory · Political science · Simple (philosophy · Voting · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Mathematics
The Future of Analytical Politics
On the approximability of the yolk by the LP yolk in the spatial model of voting
Simulation
Stable outcomes in spatial voting games
Why representatives are ideologists though voters are not
On the empirical relevance of Condorcet’s paradox
Centripetal forces in spatial voting
Logical Deficiencies in Spatial Models
Majority rule outcomes and the structure of debate in one-issue-at-a-time decision-making
Towards a theory of bicameralism
The half-win set and the geometry of spatial voting games
Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the spatial model with valence
Valence characteristics, costly policy and the median-crossing property
The Policy Opportunities in Presidential Honeymoons
The Geometry of Majority Rule
Rethinking Duverger's Law
Centre parties and coalition cabinet formations
Finagle's Law and the Finagle Point, a New Solution Concept for Two-Candidate Competition in Spatial Voting Games Without a Core
Populism, Heresthetics and Political Stability
"Volonté Generale" and the Instability of Spatial Voting Games
The Core and the Stability of Group Choice in Spatial Voting Games
Sequential Voting with Endogenous Voter Forecasts
The Voting Paradox in Socially Integrated Populations
Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point
Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule
The Theory of Committees and Elections
On Plott's pairwise symmetry condition for majority rule equilibrium
Existence of a ?structurally stable? equilibrium for a non-collegial voting rule
Majority rule outcomes and the structure of debate in one-issue-at-a-time decision-making
Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice
On division of the question
The politics of flatland
On the Rationale of Group Decision-making
Sophisticated voting over multidimensional choice spaces
A New Solution Set for Tournaments and Majority Voting
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
Decision Rules and Policy Outcomes
The Core and the Stability of Group Choice in Spatial Voting Games
| Unique citing works | 23 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,56 |
| Citation span | 1985 - 2026 (42) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 23 |